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961 
ADMISSIBILITY OF FRUITS OF BREACHED 
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES: THE IMPORTANCE 
OF ADVERSARIAL FAIRNESS, PARTY 
CULPABILITY, AND FEAR OF IMMUNITY 
ROBERT P. MOSTELLER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a patient goes to her psychiatrist and in confidence reveals 
that some years earlier she committed a homicide, describing where she 
hid the body and the murder weapon. Assume alternatively that the 
psychiatrist either is careless in discussing the case, gets very drunk, is 
overcome by concern for the victim,2 or makes a mistake about the scope 
of the privilege,3 and reveals this information to others, including the 
police. The authorities locate the body and the weapon, which they 
acknowledge they otherwise would never have found, and they assemble a 
case against the patient based on the information provided. The 
psychiatrist is not called as a witness because the government accepts that 
the evidentiary privilege bars his testimony. 
What then of the use of his statement by the prosecution to build its 
case? What then of the indirect use of the “violation of the privilege”?4 
May the prosecution go forward, or does the defendant have protection 
against both direct and indirect use of the unauthorized disclosure? 
Although the case-law discussion is relatively undeveloped, the near 
 
 
 1. Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A., 1970, University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill; J.D., 1975, Yale University; M.P.P., 1975, Harvard University. I wish to thank Ken 
Broun, Dan Capra, and Andy Taslitz for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article; 
participants in the 2002 AALS Conference on Evidence for their reactions when presented my initial 
research; and Chris Hart for his help as my research assistant. 
 2. The psychiatrist in Gruzen v. State, 591 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Ark. 1979), apparently acted with 
this motivation. 
 3. Apparently the psychiatrist in Commonwealth v. Fewell, 654 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995), revealed confidential information for this reason. See infra note 12. 
 4. It is entirely unclear that an out-of-court revelation of a confidential communication—
covered in court by an evidentiary privilege—constitutes a “violation of the privilege,” although 
semantically it is often labeled as such. As a matter of formalism, the unauthorized out-of-court 
disclosure of a confidence is a violation of confidentiality principles, and the in-court admission of a 
protected confidence is a violation of an evidentiary privilege. Largely because of the unwieldiness of 
maintaining this distinction, I will generally term the out-of-court revelation a “violation of the 
privilege.” However, the distinction is real as a matter of doctrinal analysis, and it has consequences in 
how cases are decided.  
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universal answer is that there is no protection given to the indirect or 
derivative use (also termed the “fruits” of the violation) when only an 
evidentiary privilege is involved. The statement, “no court has ever 
applied [the ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’] theory to any evidentiary 
privilege,”5 is a bit of an overstatement, but it is close to accurate.6 
Surely this answer is not correct, one might think, for the attorney-
client privilege. The result may be altered in some situations where 
lawyers are involved, not because the attorney-client privilege differs in 
kind as a privilege, but rather because of concerns for unfairness in 
litigation practices.7 In civil cases, breaches of attorney-client 
confidentiality during litigation sometimes result, not only in exclusion of 
communication, but also in an order prohibiting use of the information 
obtained from the communication in any way. In criminal prosecutions, 
provisions of the Constitution under certain fact patterns give protection to 
attorney-client confidentiality, including the attorney-client privilege, 
which also prohibits derivative use of the confidential communications. 
This Article examines two general conclusions reached by the case 
law. The first is the general non-protection of derivative use of the 
disclosure of confidential information covered by evidentiary privileges. 
The second concerns special situations where protection is sometimes 
granted. In Part II, I describe a series of cases which show the generally 
accepted result that out-of-court disclosures of confidential 
communications are not protected against derivative use. In Part III, I 
 
 
 5. United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 731 n.11 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 6. Among the cases other than Marashi reaching the result that the fruits of an out-of-court 
violation of an evidentiary privilege should not be suppressed are: United States v. Squillacote, 221 
F.3d 542, 558-60 (4th Cir. 2000); Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403, 408-09 (10th Cir. 1996); SEC v. 
OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1039-40 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695, 700 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1991); Gruzen v. State, 591 S.W.2d 342, 348-50 (Ark. 1979); State v. Sandini, 395 
So. 2d 1178, 1180-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Chase v. State, 706 A.2d 613, 617 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1998); State v. Smith, 704 A.2d 73, 78-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); People v. Ward, 604 
N.Y.S.2d 320, 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Commonwealth v. Fewell, 654 A.2d 1109, 1116 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1995). See also United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding 
fruits exclusion inapplicable to privilege for adverse spousal testimony and expressing doubt that 
violation of confidential marital communications privilege would exclude derivative evidence); but see 
James J. Dalessio, Comment, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusion of Derivative Evidence: 
Commentary and Analysis, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 625, 625, 643-47 (1989) (arguing that a minority of 
courts seem willing to exclude derivative evidence, but basing that conclusion on abstract statements 
rather than actual results). 
 7. People v. Kaiser, 606 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), which deals with a violation of the 
doctor-patient privilege by improper use of a subpoena, is unusual in imposing a remedy against 
derivative use as to a privilege other than the attorney-client privilege. The case resembles cases in the 
civil area where the court cures what it considers an affront to judicial control of discovery with a 
punitive and effective remedy—exclusion of derivative evidence. See also discussion in infra notes 
81-99 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/2
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discuss some of the doctrinal underpinnings of this result. This analysis 
gives a relatively thin, but perhaps adequate, explanation of why fruits of 
evidentiary privilege violations are not generally protected. In Parts IV and 
V, I discuss special situations in which derivative evidence is sometimes 
excluded. 
The analysis in Parts IV and V involves an interesting intersection of 
doctrines related to privileges, but privilege doctrines per se provide little 
explanation for when fruits of out-of-court violations are excluded. The 
civil cases examined in Part IV come principally from the area of 
“inadvertent disclosure” of confidential attorney-client communications 
involved in complex civil litigation, and the criminal cases discussed in 
Part V concern primarily situations where the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel protects attorney-client communications. As to both sets of cases, 
two significant factors explain whether derivative uses will be allowed or 
prohibited: interference with fairness between adversaries in the litigation 
process and clear responsibility of the adversary either for the initial 
violation of the confidence or for its purposeful exploitation. As to 
criminal prosecutions, the restrictive approach to excluding derivative 
evidence also appears to be motivated by a desire not to saddle the public 
with the consequences of private violations of rules designed to protect 
confidential relationships. As a result, courts rarely impose sanctions 
unless party/governmental responsibility, through some purposeful 
conduct of law enforcement or prosecutorial officials, makes such action 
“fair.” Fear of immunity—fear of immunizing criminal conduct as a 
practical matter if the potentially onerous burden of demonstrating no 
derivative use of lawyer-client confidences is placed on the government—
helps explain judicial reticence to provide for such an expanded remedy. 
In Part VI, I summarize the result: evidentiary privileges provide only 
limited protection for confidential communications, and one of these 
understandable limitations is that fruits of unauthorized disclosures are not 
excluded. If a stronger remedy is to be had, a justification in addition to 
privilege must be found to support protection of the confidence. I also 
recommend how privilege rules may be drafted to clarify the law as to 
both fruits and the somewhat related area of reporting requirements. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. EXAMPLES IN THE CASE LAW 
Several cases provide real-world illustrations of the derivative-use 
problem.8 In Commonwealth v. Fewell,9 Vicki Jean Fewell was 
hospitalized in a mental health facility as a result of severe depression and 
suicidal ideation following the suffocation death of her four-month-old 
son.10 That death had been investigated by the police and ruled accidental. 
However, during therapy, Fewell told her psychiatrist that she 
purposefully placed a plastic bag over her son’s head to stop his crying.11 
Although mistaken, her psychiatrist apparently believed that he was 
statutorily required to report this child abuse12 and revealed Fewell’s 
incriminating statements to the coroner’s office, which changed the 
manner of death to homicide. Some time later, Fewell was questioned by a 
police trooper regarding her son’s death, and she confessed.13 
The appellate court found that Ms. Fewell confessed to the trooper only 
after she knew that her psychiatrist had breached her confidence and that 
the trooper would never have questioned her had the confidence not been 
breached.14 Nevertheless, the court held that Fewell could not exclude her 
confession under “the exclusionary rule and ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’” 
concepts.15 
The court noted that Fewell did not claim that she was subjected to any 
police or government misconduct with respect to the revelation of the 
 
 
 8. United States v. Benner, 55 M.J. 621 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001), as to the opinion of the Army 
Court of Criminal Appeals, is similar to the other cases discussed in this section. The case involved the 
erroneous disclosure of child sexual abuse by a military chaplain in violation of the clergy privilege, 
and the court did not support suppression of derivative evidence—the defendant’s confession. Id. at 
627-29. However, the case was reversed on further review on the grounds that the confession was 
inadmissible because constitutionally involuntary. United States v. Benner, 57 M.J. 210, 213-14 
(C.A.A.F. 2002). In reversing the conviction, the majority did not examine the issue of derivative use 
of the violation of an evidentiary privilege. Id. at 213. However, the dissenting judge would have 
affirmed, inter alia, on the basis that the violation of an evidentiary privilege does not support the 
exclusion of derivative evidence. Id. at 214-15 (Crawford, C.J., dissenting). 
 9. 654 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
 10. Id. at 1111. 
 11. Id. 
 12. In a related civil case by Fewell against her doctor, the court explained that Dr. Besner was 
not required to report the suspected abuse because only those who come into contact with abused 
children are required to report under Pennsylvania’s statute. Fewell v. Besner, 664 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1995). However, the court concluded Besner was shielded from civil liability by a provision 
of a child abuse reporting law that provides immunity for those who report in good faith, id. at 579-80, 
which the court concluded could be found because another child lived in Fewell’s home who could 
have been the victim of abuse. Id. at 581. 
 13. Fewell, 654 A.2d at 1111. 
 14. Id. at 1116. 
 15. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/2
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privileged information. It reasoned that the exclusionary rule was created 
to deter future unlawful police conduct and does not apply to evidence 
obtained by private individuals and turned over to the police.16 After 
finding that the trooper’s interrogation had not itself violated any statutory 
or constitutional privilege of the defendant, the court concluded that the 
confession constituted untainted admissible evidence17 and sustained her 
conviction.18 
The court in State v. Smith19 similarly refused to suppress the 
confession of a psychiatric patient to hospital medical staff that the patient 
committed aggravated assault, even though the court assumed that the 
physician-patient privilege applied to the staff.20 Smith claimed that his 
confession to authorities should have been suppressed because it was 
derived from the revelation of his confidential communication. Among the 
reasons given by the court for rejecting his claim, the court stated: 
Assuming that a member of the treatment team violated the 
privilege, it is undisputed that the police were blameless. . . . The 
police in no way violated defendant’s privileged communication. 
Instead, they did no more than investigate the facts brought before 
them. To punish the police, and the public, for unlawful actions of 
private citizens would be an unwarranted extension of the 
exclusionary principles applicable to involuntary confessions. 
. . . . 
. . . If defendant’s confidences were violated by a member of the 
treatment team, he may sue the offending party. But to conceal 
 
 
 16. Id. The court in Gruzen v. State, 591 S.W.2d 342 (Ark. 1979), used similar analysis. It stated: 
“The exclusionary rule was developed as a deterrent to unlawful action of police officers. It is not 
applicable to action by private citizens, even when they inform state officers of matters coming to their 
knowledge.” Id. at 349. 
 17. Fewell, 654 A.2d at 1116. 
 18. Id. at 1119. In addition to triggering the investigation, Dr. Besner in fact testified at trial as to 
the statements made by Ms. Fewell to him. The court found admission of his testimony harmless error 
given the proper admission of the trooper’s testimony. Id. at 1117. 
 19. 704 A.2d 73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
 20. Id. at 78-80. The revelation came though an anonymous caller to a police detective, who 
related a conversation she had overheard between a psychiatric patient and a member of the hospital 
medial staff in which the patient admitted to an assault. Id. at 75. Because the person revealing the 
communication was unidentified, the court was unable to determine whether that person was a member 
of the treatment team, who violated a duty of confidentiality, or instead was an interloper/eavesdropper 
who overheard the conversation and whose revelation might not be considered a violation of the 
privilege. Id. at 79. In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the court assumed that the physician-patient 
privilege had been violated. Id. at 80. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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evidence of defendant’s guilt to the end that he may escape 
conviction would constitute a serious insult to the judicial process.21 
In Walstad v. State,22 the court reached this same conclusion—that 
fruits of intercepted confidences protected in some instances by both the 
psychotherapist-patient and clergy privileges should not be excluded—but 
it offered a different rationale. Therran Walstad revealed child sexual 
abuse during counseling to a minister and certified counselor, William 
Webb, who reported the abuse to the authorities.23 As a result of the report, 
Alaska state troopers began an investigation, which culminated in the 
successful prosecution of Walstad. He moved to suppress all the evidence 
obtained by the troopers because it resulted entirely from the 
minister/counselor’s disclosure of privileged information, which he 
contended “was tainted and subject to suppression as a fruit of the 
poisonous tree.”24 
The court rejected Walstad’s contention principally25 because it 
concluded that the scope of evidentiary privileges did not cover the out-of-
court revelation of his confidences.26 It ruled that privileges are of a 
“limited, testimonial nature” and “are not intended to restrict or govern 
communications between persons in general, but are instead meant to 
regulate disclosures occurring in the context of civil or criminal 
proceedings.”27 Since the report was an out-of-court statement that was not 
 
 
 21. Id. at 80; see also United States v. Seiber, 31 C.M.R. 106, 109-10 (C.M.A. 1961) (ruling that 
evidence derived from voluntary submission by defendant’s spouse of information covered by marital 
confidential communications privilege was admissible because there was no misconduct by 
government agents); State v. Sandini, 395 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (ruling that 
derivative evidence should not be excluded as to information provided by attorney regarding his client 
that formed basis for probable cause in part because the police engaged in no “misconduct” but rather 
were passive recipients for whom deterrence was not appropriate). 
 22. 818 P.2d 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). 
 23. Id. at 696. 
 24. Id. at 697. 
 25. The court also expressed some doubt whether, even if an evidentiary privilege had been 
violated, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine should be applied. It quoted with apparent approval 
a statement from Weinstein’s treatise that “[i]f the government was a party to the improper breach and 
a constitutional privilege was involved the legal fruits doctrine will apply. In other instances the court 
has some discretion. Generally it will admit, bearing in mind the general policy in favor of truth rather 
than exclusion.” Id. at 699 n.6 (quoting 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE 
¶ 512[02] (1991) (footnote omitted)).  
 26. Walstad, 818 P.2d at 669-700. Whether laws requiring reporting of child abuse abrogated the 
physician-patient privilege was a matter of some uncertainty, which the court concluded it did not need 
to resolve given that the appeal dealt only with the evidence gathered as a result of the disclosure and 
given the court’s limited construction of the scope of the privilege. Id. at 699 n.5. 
 27. Id. at 698. One part of the justification given by the court for this result was that the rules 
were promulgated by the state Supreme Court as part of its authority to “‘make and promulgate rules 
governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases,’” id. at 697 (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/2
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related to “any action, case or proceeding then pending,” the court 
concluded that 
[A]lthough it divulged confidential communications between 
Walstad and Webb, the report did not amount to a violation of the 
psychotherapist-patient or communications with clergy privileges. 
In the context in which Webb’s report was made, neither privilege 
attached. Because Webb’s report violated no privilege, the fruits of 
his report were not tainted by the violation of a privilege.28 
Nickel v. Hannigan29 presented a similar fact pattern but this time 
involved revelations of confidences by an attorney.30 Willie Nickel, after a 
fight with his employer, went to the office of Dan Boyer, an attorney who 
had previously represented him in various matters. In the course of his 
conversation with the attorney, Nickel confessed to killing a woman and 
disclosed where he had buried the body.31 After further conversations with 
Nickel and his employer and after Nickel had left his office, the attorney 
called the police and reported that Nickel had possibly committed a 
homicide, a crime of which the police were entirely unaware.32 The 
 
 
IV, § 15), which limited the impact of the rules established under “the court’s procedural rulemaking 
authority,” id. at 697-98, to the judicial realm. This explanation may limit the impact of this ruling to 
jurisdictions where evidentiary rules are established pursuant to limited judicial rulemaking power. 
However, the court also relied on the language of the rules, which mirror the federal rules language, in 
that they are applicable “in all proceedings in the courts of the State of Alaska,” ALASKA R. EVID. 
101(a), and “at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings,” ALASKA R. EVID. 101(b), in finding 
that the out-of-court revelation was not a part of a covered proceeding. Walstad, 818 P.2d at 698.  
 28. Walstad, 818 P.2d at 699; see also Chase v. State, 706 A.2d 613, 616 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1998) (ruling that information privileged as confidential marital communications was properly used to 
provide probable cause for search since privilege only applied to “witnesses in judicial proceedings, 
and not to police investigations of criminal activity”); but cf. Muetze v. State, 243 N.W.2d 393, 397-99 
(Wis. 1976) (ruling that under evidence rules privileges are specifically applicable to search warrants 
and that statements of spouse of confidential marital communications were improperly included in 
warrant affidavit). 
 The court in People v. Ward, 604 N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), also rejected an effort to 
exclude “fruits” of revelation of confidential information covered in court by an evidentiary privilege 
using similar analysis. It stated that “the ‘clergyman-penitent’ privilege is an evidentiary rule 
proscribing the revelation of privileged communications at a trial when the privilege is asserted by the 
protected party . . . . Here, revelation of defendant’s confession to the police provided probable cause 
for her arrest and subsequent prosecution.” Id. at 320 (citation omitted). 
 29. 97 F.3d 403 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 30. Id. at 405; see also State v. Sandini, 395 So. 2d 1178, 1180-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) 
(refusing to apply fruits rationale to disclosure of information violating the attorney-client privilege but 
not the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).  
 31. Nickel, 97 F.3d at 405. 
 32. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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attorney later advised Nickel to go to the police station, which he did. 
While there, Nickel confessed to the murder.33 
The district court concluded that at the time of his confession to 
attorney Boyer, Nickel had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel,34 and, as 
a result, his disclosures could not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.35 Although Nickel did not dispute that conclusion on appeal, he 
did contest the violation of attorney-client privilege through another 
avenue. He challenged the failure of his trial lawyer both to move to 
suppress his confession to the police on the grounds that “it was ‘directly 
traceable to Boyer’s violation of attorney-client privilege’”36 and to object 
on grounds of privilege to the testimony of the attorney.37 
The court of appeals rejected both arguments, albeit with little analysis 
of the justifying rationale. It held that the confession was not suppressible 
as a “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and as a result, the failure to object to 
Boyer’s testimony was not consequential because, even if suppressed, 
Nickel’s confession to the police detective would have been admissible.38 
The court stated: 
[A]lthough Mr. Nickel’s confession to [the police detective] could 
be considered the result of Mr. Boyer’s breach of Mr. Nickel’s 
attorney-client privilege in reporting Mr. Nickel to the police, there 
is no indication that [state law, here the law of Kansas] requires the 
exclusion of all evidence derived from a breach of an attorney-client 
privilege. Further, other courts have refused to apply such a broad 
evidentiary rule of exclusion to breaches of privilege.39 
In reaching the conclusion that “fruits” should not be suppressed, 
courts cite the admonition that, since privileges “undermine the search for 
the truth,”40 they should be “strictly construed.”41 In one form or another, 
 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 407. This conclusion is clearly correct under Sixth Amendment doctrine as developed 
by the United States Supreme Court. See discussion infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text. 
 35. Id. at 407. 
 36. Id. at 409 (quoting Nickel’s brief). 
 37. Id. at 407. 
 38. Id. at 409. In addition, it found that statements of another person (Susan Perret) to whom 
Nickel confessed before he spoke to attorney Boyd would have been admissible. Id. at 409. 
 39. Id. at 409 (quoting the broad statement from United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 731 
n.11 (9th Cir. 1990) that “‘no court has ever applied [the “fruits of the poisonous tree”] theory to any 
evidentiary privilege.’” (alteration in original)). In part, the result in some federal cases may be 
explained by the fact that they are reviewing convictions in state court and the evidentiary privilege 
involved is a matter of state law, which does not present a constitutional issue that can be reviewed by 
the federal court. 
 40. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 704 A.2d 73, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/2
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they frequently acknowledge Dean Wigmore’s admonition of caution 
against broadly applying privileges: 
[T]he [attorney-client] privilege remains an exception to the general 
duty to disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its 
obstruction is plain and concrete . . . . It is worth preserving for the 
sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the 
investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the 
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.42 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES AS APPLIED TO “FRUITS” 
A. A Tradition of Narrow, Cautious Formulation 
One reason for the limited remedy for violation of evidentiary 
privileges, indeed a major reason, is formalistic. The general scope of an 
evidentiary privilege is to exclude evidence at trial. As Judge Posner 
observed, the defendant could prevent “the admission of any testimony . . . 
that violated the attorney-client privilege—that is what an evidentiary 
privilege means.”43 
In the example cases described in the preceding section, the indirect 
use of the confidential information arguably presented no violation of 
these evidentiary privileges because such privileges apply only to the 
admission of the communication when offered in a judicial proceeding. 
Prohibited direct use of the protected communications was not at issue.44 
 
 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 560 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)). 
 42. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter 8 WIGMORE]. 
 43. United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989). In the case, however, the 
communications themselves had not been introduced in evidence, and Judge Posner noted that “it is far 
from clear that the proper remedy for a violation of the attorney’s duty of confidentiality is exclusion 
from the client’s criminal trial of probative evidence obtained as an indirect consequence of that 
violation.” Id. 
 44. There is both a similarity and a clear distinction between the concept developed here and that 
described in the plurality opinion of Justice Thomas in Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003). 
There Justice Thomas argues that no Fifth Amendment violation occurs until evidence is introduced in 
court despite the presence of compulsion in producing the statement outside of the courtroom. He 
argues that it is the admission of evidence that completes the constitutional violation when the 
defendant is made to be a “witness” against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 2003. 
He considers that something must be admitted; he did not relate his opinion at all on whether that 
something had to be the words uttered by the defendant or could be satisfied as well by an indirect use 
of his statement. 
 Consistent with Justice Thomas’ argument, I accept that an evidentiary privilege is not violated 
until the communication is admitted at trial. Thus, if nothing is admitted, the privilege is not violated. 
Justice Thomas does not take a position on the issue that would be of most relevance to this Article, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The professionals who received the communications were never called as 
witnesses, and the communications by the client were not offered in 
evidence. At least superficially, the out-of-court disclosure of the 
communication does not violate an evidentiary privilege, which has the 
important, but limited, purpose of allowing the privilege’s holder to 
exclude the privileged communication when it is offered in evidence.45 
This narrow application of a privilege was taken as a given by the 
United States Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States.46 The case dealt 
with the somewhat unusual and restricted “privilege against adverse 
spousal testimony”47 as to which limiting the privilege to excluding 
courtroom testimony is particularly defensible.48 Instead of confining its 
 
 
which is whether only admission of the communication itself violates the privilege or whether 
admission of indirect evidence is sufficient. 
 45. While other policies may support further sanctions, analyzed in terms of privilege theory 
alone, evidentiary privileges only prevent a witness from being compelled to disclose the 
communication in judicial proceedings (and perhaps if otherwise legally compelled). Evidentiary 
privileges do not typically speak to the disclosure of communications outside judicial settings. An 
unjustified disclosure if done by a professional authorized to receive privileged communications will 
frequently violate rules of professional responsibility. Such disclosures may in limited circumstances 
waive the privilege, but as a matter of orthodox privilege analysis, they do not constitute a violation of 
the privilege, which concerns conduct in judicial proceedings. 
 46. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). 
 47. Id. at 43. Two distinct privileges cover marital communications. See generally CHRISTOPHER 
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 5.31 & 5.32 (3d 
ed. 2003) [hereinafter MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK]. The one involved in Trammel, which bears little 
resemblance to any of the other evidentiary privileges treated in this Article, creates an “immunity” 
from testifying by one spouse as to communications of the other. It is not focused on protecting 
confidential communications and indeed does not require that the communications be confidential 
when made. Instead it focuses on allowing the spouse to avoid testifying against his or her spouse. As 
to this privilege, it is particularly appropriate not to recognize a violation when one spouse reveals 
communications of the other spouse to authorities outside of the courtroom. The privilege is about 
preventing the forced testimony of one spouse against the other in court. That is fully preserved if 
derivative evidence is admitted. 
 The other marital privilege, not at issue in Trammel, protects confidential marital 
communications. It is similar in theory and operation to the other evidentiary privileges discussed in 
this Article in being focused on protecting confidential communications. The issue of whether an 
evidentiary privilege should prohibit admission of evidence derived from out-of court revelations is the 
same here as with those other privileges.  
 48. Cases such as United States v. Winfree, 170 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1959), allow out-of-court 
use of statements by one spouse against another that would have been excluded under spousal 
immunity if they were offered at trial. Id. at 660. This privilege is a form of testimonial incompetency. 
See Muetze v. State, 243 N.W.2d 393, 398-99 (Wis. 1976) (ignoring out-of-court use is conceptually 
easy since it is designed to prevent the destructive impact to the marriage of requiring testimony). See 
also Winfree, 170 F. Supp. at 660 n.2 (quoting Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) 
(Black, J.)). A broader set of considerations come into play when the marital privilege at issue is based 
on confidential communications. See Muetze, 243 N.W.2d at 398-99 (arguing that continued protection 
is needed for marital confidential communications for the general benefit of marriages even if the 
spouse involved in the specific case had disclosed the communication outside of court). The result 
with respect to admission of derivative evidence may not change when this second privilege is 
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discussion to that particular privilege, the Court appeared to give a more 
general description of evidentiary privileges as only restricting in-court 
testimony and not at all barring the securing of information outside the 
testimonial setting. It stated: 
It is argued that abolishing the privilege will permit the Government 
to come between husband and wife, pitting one against the other. 
That, too, misses the mark. Neither Hawkins, nor any other 
privilege, prevents the Government from enlisting one spouse to 
give information concerning the other or to aid in the other's 
apprehension. It is only the spouse’s testimony in the courtroom that 
is prohibited.49 
At least part of the explanation for why evidentiary privileges do not 
require suppression of evidence derived from their “violation” is located in 
this courtroom-focused formalism. The privilege is designed to exclude 
communications, and its focus is on excluding such communications when 
they are offered in testimony at trial or some other proceeding. Disclosures 
of confidences outside the courtroom are not the primary concern of 
privileges. Outside the courtroom setting, people covered in court by 
privileges make countless numbers of decisions to disclose or not to 
disclose their private communications. This out-of-court conduct is 
concerned with a broader and somewhat different concept of 
confidences,50 which underlies evidentiary privileges to be sure but 
nevertheless remains a broader and different concept. 
This formalism is also a good starting point for analyzing the 
traditional limitation that derivative evidence is not excluded as a result of 
a violation of evidentiary privileges, or perhaps more properly, a violation 
of confidences protected by the privilege if offered at trial. At one level, 
by definition, no evidence is derived from a violation of the privilege 
because a confidence, not the privilege, is violated. No violation of the 
 
 
involved. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980); State v. Kerr, 531 
S.W.2d 536, 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (ruling that spouse’s tip to police may be used to support search 
even if confidential communications are involved). However, this result requires the rejection of a set 
of instrumental concerns regarding the revelation of confidential communications on marital harmony 
not directly implicated by the differently focused privilege that governs adverse spousal testimony. 
 49. Tramell, 445 U.S. at 52 n.12; see also State v. Rush, 456 S.E.2d 819, 823 (N.C. 1995) 
(construing the spousal privilege to cover only protection from being compelled to testify and not 
statements made out of court and offered in evidence by another witness). 
 50. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, § 5.2 (discussing the important distinction 
between confidences and privileges). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 961 Mosteller book pages.doc  3/3/2004  
 
  
 
 
 
972 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:961 
 
 
 
 
privilege occurs until the communication is offered and received in 
evidence, which we are assuming never occurs.51 
At another level, this explanation cannot or should not be totally 
correct because, if played out fully, privileges would have little meaning. 
They would have little value in encouraging free communication outside 
the courtroom if they applied only in the courtroom, and the underlying 
confidential communications could be uncovered with impunity anytime 
and in any way imaginable outside the courtroom. In other words, 
confidential communications could hardly be expected to be made freely if 
the party receiving the confidence could be routinely compelled to disclose 
them, and if despite such compulsion, every use of the evidence other than 
actual testimony were permissible.52 
For the erosion in privileges to become serious, however, the threat of 
uncovering communications out of court would need to be, or at least be 
perceived to be, somewhat substantial or beyond the control of the 
communicating parties. One reason protecting privileges by prohibiting 
testimony but not prohibiting nontestimonial use of disclosed confidences 
does not have the devastating result of impairing confidential 
communication is that our laws do not provide many mechanisms to force 
disclosure of confidences that do not involve judicial proceedings. 
I have noted elsewhere that mandatory reporting laws for suspected 
child abuse are an exception to that general pattern.53 These laws create a 
legal duty to promptly report information, often enforced by criminal 
 
 
 51. Professor Ed Imwinkelried states the point in the context of the attorney-client privilege as 
follows: 
Technically, the evidence proffered at trial is neither privileged nor the product of a privilege 
violation. To begin with, the evidence is not itself privileged. On its face, the testimony 
introduced at trial does not explicitly describe a [confidential] communication between the 
attorney and client. . . . Furthermore, the proffered testimony is not the product of a privilege 
violation. The testimony is the product of a breach of confidentiality that occurred out of 
court. . . . Because the attorney does not make the statement in court subject to compulsory 
process, the privilege itself is inapplicable. 
1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.6.6, at 617-18 
(2002) [hereinafter 1 IMWINKELRIED]; see also Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 
1997) (“The attorney-client privilege . . . is an evidentiary privilege—it protects against the compelled 
disclosure in court, or in court-sanctioned discovery, of privileged communications. It is not a roving 
commission to police voluntary, out-of-court communications.”). 
 52. Privilege laws protect against being compelled to disclose the communication when that 
compulsion occurs in the form of testimony at a judicial proceeding. Whether privilege laws should 
cover legally compelled disclosures in other contexts, such as required reporting, is a question 
discussed in the Conclusion, infra Part VI. 
 53. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The 
Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 226, 275-76 (1992) (noting the 
rarity of laws in the United States requiring the reporting of criminal conduct) [hereinafter Mosteller]. 
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penalty for non-compliance.54 Privilege laws, traditionally creatures of 
common law, are typically not prepared to deal with reporting 
requirements. Their general scope does not cover out-of-court-required 
reporting, and typically, they make no specific reference to their 
applicability to such required reports. However, the traditional limitation is 
changing or may easily be altered as privilege laws become part of 
legislatively enacted codes and as some legislatures decide explicitly to 
extend or not to extend the protection of privilege to cover reporting 
obligations.55 
The threat posed by out-of-court disclosures to the effectiveness of 
privileges is further moderated by the principle that privileges are not 
waived when the privileged material is disclosed under compulsion or 
without an opportunity for the holder to claim the privilege. For example, 
Rule 512 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence declares that the 
privilege is not waived under these circumstances. In the Advisory 
Committee’s Note, the drafters list “disclosure by an eavesdropper, by a 
person used in the transmission of a privileged communication, by a 
family member participating in psychotherapy, or privileged data 
improperly made available from a computer bank” as “illustrative 
possibilities” of situations in which there is no opportunity to claim the 
privilege.56 
However, that such disclosures do not waive the privilege does not 
resolve the issue of whether the use of information derived from their out-
of-court disclosure may be excluded. On that issue, the Proposed Federal 
Rules and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which produce the same 
 
 
 54. Id. at 212-13. 
 55. A number of states explicitly address whether privilege laws provide an excuse for not 
reporting child abuse. Some of them do so in the reporting statutes. For example, Oregon provides that 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and members of the clergy are not required to report abuse if learned 
through a privileged conversation and that attorneys are not required to report client confidences. OR. 
REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (2001). North Carolina does not require reporting when the “knowledge or 
suspicion is gained by an attorney from that attorney’s client during representation only in the abuse, 
neglect or dependency case.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (2003). The Rhode Island reporting statute 
makes clear that, except for the attorney-client privilege, privileges  do not constitute grounds for 
failure to report suspected child abuse. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1997). Oklahoma reporting 
law specifies that no privilege shall relieve any person of the obligation of reporting. 10 OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 10, § 7103(A)(3) (1998). Connecticut spells out the result in its privilege law instead. For 
psychologists it creates an exception to the privilege that permits reporting “[i]f child abuse . . . is 
known or in good faith suspected.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c(c)(4) (West Supp. 2003). As 
discussed in the Conclusion, infra Part VI, I believe explicit resolution of the issue is to be preferred, 
and I argue that the better way to reach this result is through provisions in reporting laws rather than 
general exceptions in the laws regulating privileges. 
 56. Advisory Committee’s Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 512, 56 F.R.D. at 260. 
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result,57 are silent. Nevertheless, the protection against derivative use of 
confidences could easily be made a part of this doctrine if such protection 
were deemed appropriate. Rules enforcing privileges could be redrafted to 
establish that, not only would the privilege not be waived, but also any use 
of the confidential communication disclosed under compulsion or without 
an opportunity for the holder to claim the privilege would be excluded as 
part of the concept of non-waiver. 
However, that expansive view of privilege has not been the path of 
recent legal development codifying rules of evidence. Current trends are 
likely influenced by history. It was not part of the common-law tradition 
regarding evidentiary privileges. The common-law position on this subject 
may in turn have been influenced by a related narrow view of the 
protection of the privilege for eavesdroppers. 
At least as described and shaped by Wigmore, the common-law 
position was that conversations overheard by eavesdroppers were not 
protected by the privilege, and the same rule applied to one who 
surreptitiously read or obtained a privileged document.58 The McCormick 
treatise argues that this view, which was based in part on the concept that 
once the confidence is disclosed the privilege has no remaining legitimate 
function to perform, is inconsistent with sound policy and that under a 
more modern view some voluntary action that disclosed the confidence is 
generally required to “waive” the privilege.59 Nevertheless, under the 
older, rougher view, there was less potential conflict between protecting 
the communication in court and formally ignoring out-of-court use of 
disclosed confidences. In many situations, disclosures outside the 
courtroom were considered entirely outside the privilege, unprotected, and 
indeed themselves admissible. 
However, Wigmore’s view did not come out squarely against 
maintaining the privilege in the situations described at the beginning of 
 
 
 57. UNIF. RULES OF EVIDENCE R. 510(b) (amended 1999), 13A U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 2003-2004)  
(establishing that privileges are not waived by a disclosure that was “compelled erroneously or made 
without an opportunity to claim the privilege”). 
 58. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2326, at 633-34. The McCormick treatise describes a similar 
rule for the privilege for confidential marital communications under which the privilege is lost where 
statements are overheard or documents mis-delivered. 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 82, at 333 (5th ed. 
1999) [hereinafter 1 MCCORMICK]. However, concern about “sophisticated eavesdropping techniques 
has led to curbs upon the admissibility” of such overheard communications in some jurisdictions. Id. at 
335. 
 59. 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 58, § 93, at 372-73; see also 2 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 9:26, at 68 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter RICE] (ascribing the older 
view to the argument that the client had not used sufficient efforts to prevent overhearing and 
attributing the change in the law to a different modern view about confidentiality). 
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this Article where the person receiving the communication purposefully 
conveyed it to another. As to marital confidences, Wigmore argued that 
the privileged communication could not be introduced where the 
disclosure was made with the cooperation of a marital partner.60 Likewise, 
if the attorney betrayed the interest of the client and purposefully 
communicated the information, the privilege was not breached.61 
Maintaining the privilege when the communication was offered in court 
was, however, as far as his preservation argument went. Given that the 
privilege was accepted as completely lost unless the marital partner 
cooperated in the disclosure or the attorney betrayed the client’s interest, 
the privilege concept probably could not have been assumed to provide the 
type of muscular protection needed to prohibit derivative use of the 
disclosed confidence when connivance or betrayal meant that the privilege 
was not destroyed. Whether or not these areas of privilege analysis are 
formally linked, there are certainly no indications that derivative 
protection was assumed to be part of our common-law tradition. 
In sum, privileges are indeed doctrinally focused on the courtroom and 
on the regulation of evidence offered there. Traditionally, they were not 
seen as having such a broad application as to routinely regulate 
confidential communications outside the courtroom. 
B. The Theory of Exclusion of Derivative Evidence of Constitutional 
Violations 
An evidentiary privilege contains an implicit limited exclusionary rule: 
it excludes from evidence testimony covered by the privilege. The 
communication is excluded despite unauthorized out-of-court disclosure 
by the person to whom the statements were made.62 The issue in this 
Article is thus not whether privileges should exclude evidence but whether 
 
 
 60. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2339, at 668 (arguing that oral communications remain 
privileged when conveyed by the other spouse to a third party because the privilege belongs to the 
spouse who uttered the protected communication and that written communications should remain 
privileged when voluntarily delivered by the addressee spouse to a third party, “for otherwise the 
privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written communications”); see also 1 
MCCORMICK, supra note 58, § 82, at 335 (reaching identical conclusion); Muetze v. State, 243 
N.W.2d 393, 399 (Wis. 1976) (stating that “[m]arital confidences would not be meaningful if a spouse 
could decide to reveal the confidence to a third person and thereby destroy the protection of the 
privilege”). 
 61. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2325, at 632. 
 62. UNIF. RULES OF EVIDENCE R. 510(b) (amended 1999), 13A U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 2003-2004) 
(stating black-letter principle that privileges are not waived by a disclosure that was “made without an 
opportunity to claim the privilege”). 
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the “exclusionary rule” should go further and cover evidence derived from 
the unauthorized out-of-court disclosure. 
The law does provide a clear example of derivative protection. The 
exclusionary rule courts apply to violations of the United States 
Constitution suppresses derivative evidence, often called the “fruit” of 
such violations. In determining whether the same treatment should be 
applied to violations of evidentiary privileges, a brief examination of the 
theory underlying general constitutional exclusionary principles may 
prove helpful. 
The origin of the constitutional principle of suppressing derivative 
evidence lies in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.63 There Justice 
Holmes stated the now-familiar words: “The essence of a provision 
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not 
be used at all.”64 In Nardone v. United States,65 the Court stated an 
instrumental justification for the principle that has developed further in 
exclusionary-rule jurisprudence: “To forbid the direct use of methods 
. . . but to put no curb on their full indirect use would only invite the very 
methods deemed ‘inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of 
personal liberty.’”66 On the other side of the instrumental justification is 
the familiar argument of the “general need for untrammeled disclosure of 
competent and relevant evidence.”67 
In addition, when suppression of evidence in a criminal prosecution is 
involved, both other constitutional principles68 and the basic theory of 
deterring future governmental violations require that the initial violation 
be the government’s responsibility. The Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
itself recognized the importance of the government’s responsibility.69 
Fundamental to suppressing fruits is a deterrence rationale that the 
derivative evidence should generally be suppressed to deter the 
government from future violations of constitutional rights.70 
 
 
 63. 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 64. Id. at 392. 
 65. 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
 66. Id. at 340 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937)). 
 67. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960). 
 68. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (holding that private party search does 
not violate Fourth Amendment prohibition). 
 69. Silverthorne Lumber Co., 251 U.S. at 391, 392 (stating that the case was “not that of 
knowledge acquired through the wrongful act of a stranger,” but one involving “knowledge gained by 
the Government’s own wrong”). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908-13  (1984) (discussing the central place 
the deterrence rationale holds in suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
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C. Theory of Derivative Protection Related to Evidentiary Privilege 
Violations  
Assuming there is a way to move beyond the formal problem that 
disclosure of information outside the courtroom does not constitute an 
evidentiary privilege violation (as discussed earlier in this section), then 
both normative and instrumental questions must be addressed to determine 
whether derivative evidence should be suppressed. These questions 
include: whether the values protected by privileges are important enough 
that they should be protected by this stronger remedial measure; and 
whether a “suppression remedy” that excludes fruits of privilege violations 
is necessary to achieve important policy interests protected by these 
privileges. 
Relatively little has been written regarding whether the values behind 
evidentiary privileges merit such protection. One district court baldly 
concluded that, with respect to protection of fruits, they do not: “The 
ultimate truth is that the attorney-client privilege does not enjoy that level 
in the hierarchy of values . . . .”71 No one has yet made a counter-
argument. Sometimes privileges are linked to concepts of privacy, which 
has a constitutional element,72 but privileges cover interests beyond 
privacy. Quantifying the importance of the policies behind evidentiary 
privileges is a difficult task, but it is easy to conclude that they do not 
occupy the same high level of the constitutional protections afforded 
criminal defendants under the Bill of Rights. 
Professor Ed Imwinkelried, using a non-instrumental rationale for the 
privilege, has provided an argument for why the attorney-client 
evidentiary privilege should not be treated in the same way as a 
constitutional violation. He contends that the privilege should rest on an 
“autonomy-based humanistic theory,” which is intended to provide a 
“non-constitutional means of protecting a person’s right to autonomous 
decision-making” and under which protection of fruits would likely not be 
granted.73 As distinct from a theory that the attorney-client privilege is 
based on “informational privacy,” which would likely suggest 
constitutional protection for the communication, his view of the basis of 
 
 
Amendment). 
 71. SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (N.D. Tex. 1979).  
 72. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (finding privacy right to protect 
sexual acts between consenting adult males in private); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 
(1965) (ruling constitutional privacy concern to make decision about contraception). 
 73. 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 51, § 6.6.6, at 618. 
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the attorney-client and other evidentiary privileges does not logically 
support suppression of derivative evidence associated with constitutional 
violations.74 
Professor Paul Rice argues in a limited fashion that the attorney-client 
privilege should include protection against derivative use: 
Even though the attorney-client privilege is not directly guaranteed 
by the U.S. Constitution, the logic of the derivative evidence rule 
could justify the exclusion of evidence discovered by violations of 
the . . . privilege absent constitutional implications. . . . . In 
principle, as a matter of judicial discretion, the purposes underlying 
the . . . privilege and the importance of the privilege to our 
adversarial system could justify the same protection. Although the 
privilege is not guaranteed by the constitution, it gives life and 
meaning to constitutional guarantees and should assiduously be 
protected with the same rigor and by the same remedies.75 
As to the attorney-client privilege, Rice argues that its violation should 
be treated as would a constitutional violation when that privilege 
supplements those constitutional protections. Thus, his argument is not for 
derivative protection for evidentiary privileges in their own right but when 
evidentiary privileges are acting in aid of constitutional rights. Moreover, 
he recognizes that this expansive remedy should not be automatic but 
should be exercised as a matter of judicial discretion.76 
Professor Rice’s argument is certainly tenable.77 It is basically an 
argument for extension of the protection, recognized at least theoretically 
 
 
 74. Id. at 618-19. 
 75. RICE, supra note 59, § 10:10, at 56. 
 76. Id. In making the argument Professor Rice cites United States ex rel. Shiflet v. Lane, 815 F.2d 
457 (7th Cir. 1987), and United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509 (7th Cir. 1989), cases where the 
expanded remedy would be appropriate. The court in Shiflet v. Lane found no due process violation 
because, although a defense investigator provided privileged information to the police, the government 
conduct was not considered sufficiently egregious. 815 F.2d at 465-66. In White, after remand, the 
court of appeals agreed with the district court that no privileged information obtained from the 
defendant’s prior attorney had been used at trial and that the defendant had shown no substantial 
prejudice. United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 431-32 (7th Cir. 1991). Contrary to Professor Rice’s 
statement in his treatise that the court had found that confidential communications from White’s 
former attorney had “‘provided leads to evidence that the government did use,’” RICE, supra note 59, 
§ 10.10, at 56 (quoting White, 879 F.2d at 1513), the court made no such finding. Rather, in remanding 
the case, the court speculated that “some of them [the arguably privileged documents] may, for all that 
appears, have provided leads to evidence that the government did use.” White, 879 F.2d at 1513 
(emphasis added). 
 77. Professor’s Rice’s argument is not inconsistent with my approach in criminal cases. I believe 
the Due Process Clause can handle the most meritorious cases, and unlike Professor Rice, I find it 
difficult to justify an exclusion of derivative evidence in criminal cases if the Constitution is not 
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by courts under the Due Process Clause,78 which he would apparently 
apply to a somewhat larger, but undefined, set of cases. It also offers some 
justification for distinguishing in most situations the attorney-client 
privilege from other privileges. However, his argument for occasional 
special treatment of the attorney-client privilege does not cover the 
attorney-client privilege generally but rather depends on a more specific 
examination of the need for fairness in the criminal litigation process as it 
implicates constitutional protections. 
The second inquiry is instrumental. The principal concerns are whether 
failure to exclude derivative evidence will encourage violations and 
thereby undermine the goals supported by these privileges, and whether 
alternative remedies such as civil liability or disciplinary sanctions are 
adequate when professionals are involved.79 The answers to these 
questions, which are empirical in nature, are not entirely clear. However, 
there is no evidence of any major erosion of the effectiveness of privileges 
as a consequence of the denial of exclusion of fruits and thus no strong 
indication that a change in the law is required based on instrumental 
reasons. 
Party culpability may play an important role here. We know from the 
suppression of derivative evidence when a constitutional violation is 
involved that unless the government is an active agent in some fashion, the 
Constitution does not support a remedy. We will see in later sections that a 
similar rule of thumb appears to be used when derivative evidence is 
suppressed in the civil context. These outcomes are likely supportable for 
instrumental reasons. Where the opposing party is responsible, indeed 
culpable, for the disclosure of the confidence, exclusion of not only the 
direct evidence but also the indirect benefits of the breach of 
confidentiality may be important to discourage actions eroding privileges 
in the future. In criminal cases, such party responsibility would require 
active governmental involvement, which was not present in the example 
cases discussed in Part II. 
 
 
directly violated. However, like Professor Rice, I suggest a somewhat broader application of due 
process and thereby would reach a result not very different than what he seems to be advocating. See 
infra Part VI.  
 78. See discussion of due process cases infra in Part V.D.1. 
 79. See State v. Sandini, 395 So. 2d 1178, 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that 
alternative remedies are not clearly inadequate to deter claimed emasculation of attorney-client 
privilege); State v. Smith, 704 A.2d 73, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (arguing that rather than 
suppression of fruits, the defendant’s remedy is to sue members of the treatment team who may have 
violated his physician-patient privilege). 
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IV. EXCLUDING “FRUITS” IN CIVIL CASES TO CONTROL JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS, SANCTION VIOLATIONS OF ADVERSARIAL FAIRNESS, AND 
PROTECT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
In contrast to the introductory group of (criminal) cases, where courts 
uniformly refuse to prohibit derivative use of privileged communications 
acquired out of court, courts in another group of (civil) cases sometimes 
prohibit derivative use of confidential materials that are “improperly” 
obtained. A common example is found when materials covered by the 
attorney-client privilege are inadvertently or purposefully obtained by 
opposing counsel. Courts frequently order their exclusion and sometimes 
prohibit indirect use of the documents obtained as well.80 
A. Judicial Power To Impose Remedies for Violations of Information-
Disclosure Procedures 
One element of exclusion of derivative use rests on concerns of the 
type announced in In re Shell Oil Refinery,81 in which the district court 
dealt with willful actions by a party considered by the court to have 
violated principles of litigative fairness. In that case, Shell learned that its 
adversaries, the Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee (PLC), had obtained Shell 
documents outside the discovery process through a current Shell 
employee.82 Shell sought a listing of all documents written or received by 
Shell that had been obtained by PLC.83 
The district court ordered PLC to return the documents to Shell, and it 
also prohibited PLC “from mak[ing] any use of the documents.”84 The trial 
judge found that PLC effectively circumvented the discovery process and 
 
 
 80. Exclusion of evidence derived from inadvertently disclosed information may also result from 
the parties’ negotiated confidentiality agreements or protective orders. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. 
St. Jude Med., Inc., No. IP96-1718-C-H/G, 2001 WL 699850, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 29, 2001) 
(enforcing agreement that if recipient is notified within specified period that it shall return all copies of 
inadvertently disclosed documents and “not use the information in the document for any purpose”). 
Such agreements are common, although it appears that more commonly they may require only the 
return or destruction of all inadvertently disclosed materials and not explicitly prohibit indirect use. 
See, e.g., VLT Corp. v. Unitrode Corp., 194 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D. Mass. 2000); Prescient Partners, L.P. v. 
Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No. 96 CIV.7590(DAB)(JCF), 1997 WL 734726, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 
1997). 
 81. 143 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. La. 1992). 
 82. Id. at 107. 
 83. Id. Shell also asked that the court order PLC to identify the person who supplied the 
documents so that it could determine if PLC had violated LOUISIANA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
4.2 (2002), Louisiana’s prohibition against ex parte contacts with represented parties. Id. at 108. The 
court declined to provide the identity because doing so was unnecessary to an effective remedy. Id. 
 84. Shell, 143 F.R.D. at 109. 
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thereby prevented Shell from being able to argue against, and to prevent, 
production of proprietary documents. The court also concluded that PLC’s 
conduct was “inappropriate and contrary to fair play.”85 
The court justified its power to fashion this remedy, not under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,86 but pursuant to its “inherent authority 
to control and preserve the integrity of its judicial proceedings”87 and “to 
remedy litigation practices that threaten . . . the adversary processes.”88 
Under this authority, it ruled that “plaintiffs may not make any use of the 
documents obtained from the Shell-employee source or any use of the 
information contained therein.”89 
B. Protection Against Indirect Use of Privileged Information in the Area 
of “Inadvertent Disclosure” of Attorney-Client Confidences  
In re Southeast Banking Corp.90 shows the operation of the court’s 
equitable power moving from the context of purposeful acquisition of 
privileged materials91 to an “inadvertent disclosure” of confidential 
 
 
 85. Id. at 108. Elsewhere, it referred to an “unfair advantage” gained by PLC. Id. It also 
described its effort as being one of “balancing the scales.” Id. at 108-09. 
 86. The court rested its remedy on inherent powers because it concluded that, as to documents 
obtained outside the court’s discovery processes, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did 
not authorize district courts to issue protective orders. Id. at 109 & n.3 (citing Kirshner v. Uniden 
Corp., 842 F.2d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 87. Id. at 109. 
 88. Id. at 108. 
 89. Id. at 109. Also, in Lipin v. Bender, 644 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1994), the New York Court of 
Appeals approved dismissal of the case as a sanction for knowing and deliberate use of documents 
covered by the attorney-client and work-product privileges that gave the plaintiff knowledge the court 
believed could never be purged. Id. at 1304. In reaching the conclusion, the trial court had emphasized 
the nature and persistence of the party’s misconduct. Id. at 1304-05.  
 90. 212 B.R. 386 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
 91. For a sampling of views on this issue, see John T. Hundley, “Inadvertent Waiver” of 
Evidentiary Privileges: Can Reformulating the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 263, 289 (1995) [hereinafter Hundley] (recognizing that efforts “to ‘put the genie back in the 
bottle’” are defensible where disclosure results from the party’s culpable conduct); Richard L. Marcus, 
The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1635 (1986) [hereinafter 
Marcus] (assuming courts can “suppress” evidence when it has been stolen, much as illegally seized 
evidence is suppressed in criminal cases). 
 Case law supporting the suppression remedy is relatively sparse. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Ass’n 
of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local Union No. 189, 311 F. 
Supp. 464, 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (coerced interviews ordered not to be used “for any purpose 
whatsoever”). Commentators treat the “suppression” of evidence, including the prohibition of 
derivative use, as a special situation and justifiable where culpable conduct is involved by the party 
securing the privileged information. Indeed, in an unusually broad remedy in a criminal case not 
involving a constitutional violation, the court in People v. Kaiser, 606 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), 
excluded any use of a violation of the doctor-patient privilege. There the court concluded that the 
prosecutor used a subpoena to secure confidential medical information covered by the doctor-patient 
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materials which would be covered at trial under the attorney-client 
privilege.92 In Southeast Banking, through what the trial court determined 
was an error,93 counsel for the Trustee was given access to a group of 
“post-closing” documents that the parties agreed were protected by the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine and to which the FDIC 
had formally denied the Trustee access.94 The Trustee’s review was 
supposed to be made of another set of materials—“pre-closing” 
documents.95 However, despite notice that “post-closing” documents had 
been erroneously provided, the Trustee copied a number of them, used 
them to fashion his complaint, and sought to use them in the litigation.96 
The court determined that the privilege had not been waived.97 Citing, 
inter alia, In re Shell Oil Refinery and a court’s power to sanction actions 
of errant lawyers practicing before it,98 the court ordered the immediate 
return of the post-closing documents. It also entered a protective order 
prohibiting the Trustee “from using any of the post-closing documents or 
the information contained therein, directly, or indirectly, for any purpose 
whatsoever.”99 
 
 
privilege and that the subpoena was used to avoid ordinary discovery mechanisms that would have 
permitted litigation of the privilege before the communication was revealed. Id. at 699. 
 92. A substantial literature has developed analyzing “inadvertent disclosures.” See George A. 
Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REV. 637 (1986); 
Shawn T. Gaither, The Attorney-Client Privilege: An Analysis of Involuntary Waiver, 48 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 311 (2000); James M. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through 
Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1985); Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: 
A Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465 (1993); Hundley, supra note 91; Trina Jones, 
Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law of Mistake: Using Substantive Legal 
Principles To Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY L.J. 1255 (1999); Marcus, supra note 91; 
Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An 
Economic Analysis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 513 (1990); Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and 
the Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Materials: Attorney Responsibility as the Governing Precept, 
47 FLA. L. REV. 159 (1995); Gloria A. Kristopek, Note, To Peek or Not to Peek: Inadvertent or 
Unsolicited Disclosure of Documents to Opposing Counsel, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 643 (1999). 
 93. Southeast Banking, 212 B.R. at 392-93. The Trustee contended that the documents were 
“voluntarily produced,” but the court concluded they were produced through error, relying on the fact 
that in the litigation the FDIC was vigorously contesting the turnover of these same documents to the 
Trustee. Id. at 393. 
 94. Id. at 390. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 390-91. 
 97. Id. at 392-93. Under either the rule that only intentional action waives the privilege or the 
balancing test, the court concluded that the privilege had not been waived. It rejected the approach 
under which inadvertent disclosure always waives the privilege. Id. 
 98. Id. at 395 (citing inter alia, Shell, 143 F.R.D. at 109). 
 99. Id. at 397. Sanctions were also imposed against the offending attorney. Id. at 396-97. 
 In Transportation Equip. Sales Corp. v. BMY Wheeled Vehicles, 930 F. Supp. 1187 (N.D. Ohio 
1996), the court ordered return of the inadvertently disclosed document and the avoidance of any 
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Fashioning remedies, which may include precluding a party from 
making any derivative use of confidences disclosed, is consistent with the 
law of inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents, which are often 
disclosed during discovery in complex civil cases.100 Courts apply three 
major approaches to determine whether inadvertent disclosure should be 
treated as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.101 These have variously 
been called: (1) the “lenient approach” or the “subjective intent approach”; 
(2) the “strict (liability) approach”; and (3) the “middle test,” “pragmatic 
approach,” or “totality of the circumstances test.”102 Jumping to the end of 
the story, the majority of courts follow the third test,103 which, it turns out, 
fits well with an approach that allows prohibition of any use of the 
disclosure in some cases where the privilege is found not to have been 
waived by inadvertent disclosure. 
Under the first approach, called the “lenient” or “subjective intent” 
approach, an inadvertent disclosure cannot waive the privilege: the 
privilege is waived only by the intentional act taken or authorized by the 
client. This approach is most consistent with a central principle of the 
attorney-client privilege—that it exists to protect the client, belongs to the 
client, and must be waived by the client.104 However, several major 
objections are raised to this approach. First, it ignores the importance of 
confidentiality, which, when lost, eliminates much of the purpose of the 
privilege.105 Second, it establishes a burden that is arguably too difficult to 
 
 
further use of the document or information gained as a result of the disclosure. Id. at 1189. It also 
required the offending party to list all those who had learned of the contents of the documents and to 
describe the steps taken to ensure that no improper use of the information learned would be made 
during the course of the litigation. Id.  
 100. The suppression of derivatively obtained evidence in this context may address a frequent 
concern in the inadvertent disclosure area: of the degree to which revelation of a confidence about one 
subject destroys the privilege as to all documents related to that subject. Marcus, supra note 91, at 
1609 (noting that where waiver is found “it is effective as to all related matters, precluding later 
assertion of the privilege as to any material related to the same subject”). The order prohibiting the 
derivative use of the disclosed information has the effect of ruling that the related documents are 
likewise protected. When used or understood in this fashion, the result is not an expansive one but is 
rather the consequence of a ruling that the privilege remains intact as to the original disclosure. 
 101. When the disclosure is truly inadvertent, it is technically inappropriate to use the term 
“waiver,” which normally entails an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Rather “forfeiture” 
may be a more appropriate term, which some courts believe is “designed ‘to punish the person 
claiming the privilege for a mistake.’” United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 175 
n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 
1997)). 
 102. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1483 (8th Cir. 1996); TRW, 204 F.R.D. at 176. 
 103. TRW, 204 F.R.D. at 176-77. 
 104. Bicknell, 86 F.3d at 1483. 
 105. Id. at 1483; see also Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 
549 (D.D.C. 1970). 
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meet. Requiring the opponent to show an explicit intent to waive through 
disclosure allows clients, upon discovery of a damaging disclosure, to 
deny such an intention to waive despite having given counsel a general 
authorization to handle litigation.106 Third, it provides too little incentive 
for lawyers to protect confidential and privileged information.107 
The second approach, called the “strict (liability) approach,” has a 
wisdom in that conduct often reflects intention: “Normally the amount of 
care taken to ensure confidentiality reflects the importance of that 
confidentiality to the holder of the privilege.”108 This approach was 
favored by Wigmore, who stated his position and the justification as 
follows: 
. . . All involuntary disclosures, in particular, through the loss or 
theft of documents from the attorney’s possession, are not protected 
by the privilege, on the principle . . . that, since the law has granted 
secrecy so far as its own process goes, it leaves the client and 
attorney to take measures of caution sufficient to prevent being 
overheard by third persons. The risk of insufficient precautions is 
upon the client.109 
However, the problems with this second approach are also obvious. 
Clearly, action does not always reflect intent. The test converts what is at 
best a forfeiture into a waiver, and it encourages sharp practices by 
opponents. In simple terms, this test is simply too harsh. 
Under the third test, termed the “middle test,” the “pragmatic 
approach,” or the “totality of circumstances test,” which as noted earlier is 
the majority position, courts examine a number of factors: 
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent 
inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent of document production, 
(2) the number of inadvertent disclosures, (3) the extent of the 
disclosure, (4) the promptness of measures taken to rectify the 
 
 
 106. Cf. Hydraflow, Inc., v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). Wigmore argued that 
all disclosures voluntarily made by counsel during the course of negotiations or litigation should be 
receivable as being made under an implied waiver by the attorney who is considered to have authority 
to disclose confidences when necessary in the opinion of the attorney, unless the attorney appears to 
have acted in bad faith toward the client. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2325, at 633. 
 107. Bicknell, 86 F.3d at 1483. 
 108. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 109. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2325, at 633. 
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disclosure, and (5) whether the overriding interests of justice would 
or would not be served by relieving the party of its error.110 
This inquiry goes in part toward determining the intent of the party with 
regard to waiver, but it focuses even more on fairness: “The middle test is 
best suited to achieving a fair result. It accounts for the errors that 
inevitably occur in modern, document-intensive litigation, but treats 
carelessness with privileged material as an indication of waiver.”111 In this 
balancing process of determining whether the privilege has been waived, 
courts often engage in an inquiry that combines a number of factors 
relating to the diligence of the disclosing party, the reliance of the 
receiving party, the destruction of confidentiality, and the possibility of 
meaningful, limited relief.112 
Particularly related to our inquiry, one court articulated its focus as 
being on “[t]he degree to which the disclosed information has been 
allowed to ‘weave itself into the fabric . . . of pre-trial discovery so as to 
create reliance by the opponent.’”113 Another found that work product 
privilege had been waived when the complaining party did not file a 
timely motion to compel the return of the documents because “the grand 
jury’s use of the seized file potentially could have tainted its 
investigation.”114 Similarly, a third court, looking at the difficulty of 
fashioning a remedy, stated that 
[I]t would be unfair and unrealistic now to permit the privilege’s 
assertion as to these documents which have been thoroughly 
examined and used by the Government for several years. The 
Government attorneys’ minds cannot be expunged, the grand jury is 
familiar with the documents, and various witnesses’ testimony 
regarding the papers has been heard. This is not a case of mere 
inadvertence where the breach of confidentiality can be easily 
 
 
 110. Hydraflow, 145 F.R.D. at 637; see also Bicknell, 86 F.3d at 1484.  
 111. Bicknell, 86 F.3d at 1484. 
 112. The court in Simon Property Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 644 (S.D. Ind. 2000), 
combined a number of the factors examined as to inadvertent disclosure under its concern for whether 
effective relief was possible. It found no waiver in large part because the privileged information had 
not been shared with opposing counsel and was not related to the testimony of the one witness who 
had reviewed the documents. Id. at 649-50. As a result, continuing or restoring the privilege to the 
documents was effective and did not distort the litigation process. Id. at 650. 
 113. Hydraflow, 145 F.R.D. at 637. 
 114. In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d 978, 982-83 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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remedied. Here, the disclosure cannot be cured simply by a return of 
the documents. The privilege has been permanently destroyed.115 
Other courts discuss these same issues in terms of whether 
confidentiality can be meaningfully restored through reasonable remedies. 
In one case, the court found the documents had “not worked their way into 
the fabric of the case” because, although known to a government 
investigator, they had not been presented to the grand jury nor shown to 
witnesses or experts.116 The court did not assume the minds of the 
government attorney or expert could be expunged, but the documents 
would be excluded from evidence, and that remedy “would not be a 
meaningless or empty gesture.”117 
Even when the information has been disclosed to counsel, an effective 
remedy may still be possible by disqualifying counsel. However, that 
remedy is not one that courts easily embrace because of obvious ways that 
the disqualification remedy can be abused by an adversary for tactical 
benefit and delay,118 and disqualification is generally rejected if prejudice 
can be avoided by other means.119 
Taken together, these factors from the middle test produce a concept of 
privilege that can allow for a variegated protection of the privilege. In 
appropriate circumstances, it may prohibit exclusion of the fruits-of-
privilege violation. Its multi-factored analysis may result in protection 
only against admission of the documents in court, but it may also prohibit 
any use whatsoever. Both party responsibility (sometimes culpability) and 
practicality are part of the analysis. 
If the documents have woven themselves into the fabric of the case, 
particularly if the intermingling is with the acquiescence of the party who 
held the privilege, the test tends to lead one to conclude that the privilege 
has been waived. If the confidence has been breached only in a limited 
fashion, the test is likely to lead one to conclude that the privilege still 
exists and that exclusion of the evidence itself may a be sufficient remedy. 
 
 
 115. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(citations omitted). 
 116. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 281 (M.D.N.C. 1992). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See, e.g., Holland v. The Gordy Co., Nos. 231183, 231184, 231185, 2003 WL 1985800, at 
*10-*11 (Mich. App. Apr. 29, 2003); Milford Power Ltd. v. New England Power Co., 896 F. Supp. 53, 
58 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 119. See The Gordy Co., 2003 WL 1985800, at *12. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. First of America 
Bank, 868 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Mich. 1994), the court denied disqualification in part because even 
disqualification would be ineffective since the party already knew the content of the document. Id. at 
220-21. 
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In extreme cases, the test allows an extreme result. When the equities 
stand on the side of the party who inadvertently disclosed (or who was the 
victim of misconduct by the adversary), a broader remedy may be 
appropriate. These outcomes are reasonable as part of the court’s effort to 
control complex civil litigation between private parties. Fashioning 
appropriate remedies is partly a determination of attorney-client privilege 
principles, but it is even more influenced by developing a fair process (or 
at least avoiding one party getting an unfair advantage) between 
competing litigators involved in a joint enterprise. 
This freedom to fashion remedies in civil litigation rests in part on the 
fact that the only interests involved are those of two opposing private 
parties. Moreover, the orders preventing indirect use of the disclosed 
communication in civil cases typically have a more limited impact than 
they do in criminal cases. Such orders frequently exclude only a subset of 
documents and guarantee that the remedy is effective by protecting related 
documents as well.120 In the typical case, exclusion of derivative evidence 
does not appear to resolve or terminate the litigation effectively. 
C. Implications for Rules Drafting Regarding Inadvertent Disclosure  
Like most “codifications” of privilege rules, the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, through Rule 510, cover how privileges are waived but do not 
address directly the important and complicated subject of waiver through 
“inadvertent disclosure.”121 By contrast, a subcommittee of the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence attempted to develop rules to 
govern when inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege as 
part of a preliminary effort to draft rules of privilege.122 The draft proposal 
also treated the issue of derivative use of material when waiver was not 
found,123 presumably to deal with an aspect of existing case law. Although 
the Advisory Committee has now moved away from attempting to draft 
rules of privilege,124 its preliminary effort is instructive. 
 
 
 120. See, e.g., Van Hull v. Marriott Courtyard, 63 F. Supp. 2d 840 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (denying 
both production of inadvertently disclosed document and use of the information to obtain other 
communications regarding same subject matter); Telephonics Corp. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 360, 
362 (Fed. Cl. 1994) (accepting that information could not be eliminated from opponents’ minds but 
denying requests for other documents bearing on the same subject matter). See also discussion in 
supra note 100. 
 121. UNIF. RULES OF EVIDENCE R. 510 (amended 1999), 13A U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 2003-2004). 
 122. Memorandum from Professor Dan Capra, Reporter, and Ken Broun, Consultant, regarding 
“New Drafts of Privilege” 48 (Mar. 21, 2002) (on file with author). 
 123. Id. 
 124. The Committee has decided that, rather than attempting to draft privilege rules, it will 
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After setting out a test for loss of the privilege through inadvertent 
disclosure, the draft stated regarding direct and derivative use: 
If the court finds that an inadvertent disclosure does not result in the 
loss of the privilege, the party who received the privileged 
information is prohibited from proffering that information at trial. 
The receiving party is also prohibited from proffering any evidence 
that is derived directly or indirectly from the privileged information. 
The party who disclosed the privileged information has the burden 
of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
information proffered by the receiving party is derived from the 
privileged information.125 
This proposed provision would have provided one possible solution to the 
issue of derivative use of evidence from a violation of the privilege. 
However, it would have created a potential unexplained inconsistency 
with other areas of privilege where derivative use is generally permitted 
under current law. Alternatively, it might have been read to suggest that all 
out-of-court disclosures that did not waive the privilege (i.e., violations of 
confidences underlying evidentiary privileges) should generally result in 
the prohibition of derivative use of evidence. Such a reading would have 
constituted a major change in the law. 
The proposal would have protected indirect uses more broadly than 
current case law dealing with inadvertent disclosures. While exclusion of 
derivative evidence is sometimes ordered by courts when inadvertent 
disclosures are found not to waive the attorney-client privilege, such 
exclusion is not generally a consequence of determining that, despite an 
out-of-court disclosure, the attorney-client privilege continues to exist. For 
example, in a situation where the privilege is not waived because of 
intentional disclosure by the person receiving the information, courts 
frequently do not suppress derivative evidence even though the law is 
clear that the privilege is not waived. 
Although frequently the same factors that lead the court to determine 
the privilege has not been waived through an inadvertent disclosure will 
indicate that derivative uses should be excluded, the two issues are not the 
same. In some situations, the privilege might reasonably be maintained, 
 
 
develop a survey of federal evidentiary privileges, providing a descriptive, non-evaluative presentation 
of existing federal law. Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 
18, 2002, at 14-15; Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 25, 
2003, at 18-19. 
 125. Id. 
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but the court might nevertheless determine that only direct use of the 
communication would be prohibited. 
While the clarity of a rule as to waiver through “inadvertent disclosure” 
may be generally helpful, I suggest that, with respect to the issue of 
derivative use, the better solution is to leave a solution out of privilege 
rules. With regard to inadvertent disclosure, automatic exclusion of fruits 
does not appear to be appropriate or justified every time the court 
concludes that the attorney-client privilege has not been waived. Without 
the explicit authority of a rule, federal courts have felt themselves able to 
impose the broad remedy of excluding indirect uses in appropriate cases, 
and that broad remedy is likely better left to the exercise of judicial 
discretion in situations of special justification.126 
V. INTRUSION OF GOVERNMENT AGENTS INTO ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
CONFIDENCES IN CRIMINAL CASES: A FOCUS ON INTENTIONAL 
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND A PATTERN OF CAUTIOUS AND  
LIMITED RELIEF 
A body of federal case law dealing with intrusion into confidential 
attorney-client relations and interception of communications helps both to 
flesh out the limits on the attorney-client privilege and to identify where 
violations of attorney-client confidences, typically communications 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, result in suppression of 
derivative use of the information acquired in criminal cases. The analysis 
involves a number of doctrinal areas. These include: the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel and the concomitant right to protection against ineffective 
assistance of counsel; the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination; the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments; and the attorney-client privilege and rules of professional 
responsibility. In examining the area, one finds surprisingly limited power 
 
 
 126. An earlier draft had permitted the party receiving the information to use the fruits in part 
because of the perceived unfairness of requiring that party to establish that other information was not 
derived from the privileged material. See Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the 
Meeting of April 17, 2000, at 11. As a result of Committee suggestions, the Subcommittee on 
Privileges redrafted the provision, excluding derivative evidence but placing the burden on the party 
asking for exclusion to show that the evidence was derived from privileged material. The change was a 
sensible response to the potentially onerous burden of imposing a Kastigar-type regime on the party 
who received the privileged information in these civil cases. However, it neither eliminated the initial 
question of whether derivative use of privileged information should always be suppressed where the 
disclosure could be categorized as inadvertent nor the question of whether inadvertent disclosure 
provided a justification for different treatment of the derivative evidence. 
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for the attorney-client privilege and an apparent reluctance to reverse 
based on possible intrusion into defense confidences. 
Dividing violations into two types is useful. In the first are revelations 
of confidences by defense attorneys or their agents. There, a constitutional 
violation may be found as a consequence of ineffective assistance of 
counsel without further governmental involvement, and indirect uses of 
communications are covered if the client is materially affected. In the 
second kind of violation, action is by law enforcement personnel and 
members of the prosecution. Here, party responsibility/culpability is 
absolutely critical. As to cases in this category, courts simply do not find a 
violation of the attorney-client privilege by private parties sufficient to 
justify suppressing fruits of the violation, often noting the important public 
interest in prosecuting crime. A constitutional violation, based on 
governmental responsibility in a form that varies with the constitutional 
right at issue, is required. 
A. The Relationship Between Principles of Confidentiality and the Sixth 
Amendment 
The central concept of the attorney-client privilege—protecting 
confidences between the accused and his or her counsel—is 
constitutionally protected under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 
some of its aspects. While few would doubt the essential correctness of the 
statement, “the essence of the Sixth Amendment right is . . . privacy of 
communication with counsel,”127 the precise relationship between the 
attorney-client privilege and the protection given to confidences under the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has not been carefully examined by the 
courts. Although related, these concepts obviously do not have identical 
dimensions. 
The relationship between the attorney-client privilege and the Sixth 
Amendment is conceptually clear in two situations. The first is where the 
defendant has formally become the accused, the Sixth Amendment has 
“attached,”128 and the attorney or an agent discloses privileged 
communications to the government. The question here is whether the 
 
 
 127. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Henry, 
447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Sixth Amendment, of course, 
protects the confidentiality of communications between the accused and his attorney”); United States 
v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 128. See discussion of when the Sixth Amendment attaches, infra notes 189-90 and accompanying 
text. 
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revelation violates the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
Professional standards regarding confidentiality and the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel intersect here. In Strickland v. Washington,129 
the court required a party challenging counsel’s conduct to show both 
deficient performance under objective standards of reasonable 
effectiveness and that prejudice resulted from that deficient 
performance.130 In determining whether defense “counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”131 the Court observed 
that the “proper measure” of performance is “reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms.”132 The Court noted that as to the standard 
of practice, “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar 
Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is 
reasonable,”133 but it cautioned that “they are only guides.”134 In Nix v. 
Whiteside,135 the Court, without defining the weight to be given to such 
standards, found them dispositive where “virtually all of the sources speak 
with one voice.”136 
The “duty of loyalty” is one of the essential components of reasonable 
performance by defense counsel identified by Strickland v. Washington.137 
Within the duty of loyalty, the “duty of confidentiality,” covered by ABA 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, is very widely recognized.138 It 
 
 
 129. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 130. Id. at 687. 
 131. Id. at 688. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (citation omitted). 
 134. Id. 
 135. 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (ruling that an attorney’s revelation of prospective client perjury did not 
constitute ineffective assistance). The Court reiterated its statement from Strickland v. Washington, 
that “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association Standards and the like, 
. . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides,” 466 U.S. at 165, but it 
cautioned against constitutionalizing specific standards that might restrict states in their future 
development of professional standards. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 165-66. 
 136. Id. at 165-66. The conduct in question was the lawyer’s refusal to cooperate with the client’s 
giving perjured testimony and the lawyer’s threat to inform the trial judge if the client took the stand to 
testify falsely and to withdraw as counsel. Id. at 161. 
 137. 466 U.S. at 688. 
 138. See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2003). In McClure, the court of 
appeals found that the revelation of the location of homicide victims’ bodies did not constitute 
ineffective assistance—even though the appellate court gave the required deference to the conclusions 
of the state courts and the federal district court—because of the exception to the duty of confidentiality 
for prevention of future crimes. Id. at 1245-47. The argument was that the lawyer believed the victims 
may have still been alive and disclosed the information to potentially avoid the escalation of 
kidnapping into murder. Id. at 1245. 
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protects confidences and secrets of a client. Confidences covered by the 
attorney-client privilege are assuredly within that protected confidentiality. 
Clearly, the purposeful revelation of client confidences covered by the 
attorney-client privilege constitutes ineffective assistance if the revelation 
is sufficiently material to satisfy the prejudice requirement of Strickland v. 
Washington. In defining prejudice, the Court in no way suggested that the 
prejudice to be considered excluded evidence derived from the attorney’s 
conduct. Indeed, such a distinction would be inconsistent with the other 
types of deficient performance examined, such as the failure to seek out 
and present witnesses regarding mitigation.139 
Thus, confidentiality of communications between lawyer and client is a 
part of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the protections of the 
attorney-client privilege and rules of professional responsibility regarding 
client confidences are associated with that protection. While the attorney-
client privilege is not directly constitutionalized, its dimensions are 
important in defining and limiting the protections for confidentiality. 
Indeed, when the attorney-client relationship is protected by the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, fundamental infringements of the privilege 
should violate the Sixth Amendment as well if prejudice ensues. When the 
defendant has been formally accused and Sixth Amendment protection has 
attached,140 use of revelations by counsel of the type discussed earlier in 
Nickel v. Hannigan,141 regarding the location of key evidence, should 
result both in reversal of the conviction and in exclusion of all direct and 
indirect evidence on retrial.142 
It is interesting to note that in this context no affirmative governmental 
action is required. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by 
the private attorney’s action when defense counsel’s representation is so 
deficient and prejudicial that it constitutes “a breakdown in the adversary 
process that renders the result unreliable.”143 
 
 
 139. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. The Court rejected the argument, not because the prejudice was 
of a type not to be considered, but rather because the Court concluded the witnesses would have had 
no impact. Id. at 699-700. 
 140. The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is limited to cases where formal charges 
have been filed. See infra notes 189-90.  
 141. 97 F.3d 403 (10th Cir. 1996); see discussion supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text. 
 142. Because the Sixth Amendment right is limited to cases where the defendant becomes the 
accused, see infra notes 189-90, and is restricted to those specific offenses formally charged, see Texas 
v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-73 (2001) (narrowly construing the charged offense), protection could not 
be extended to a case like Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403 (10th Cir. 1996), where the authorities had 
no prior knowledge of the offense. The Sixth Amendment cannot be applicable to such an offense that 
is unknown to authorities. However, surely items of evidence as to formally charged offenses, such as 
the location of the murder weapon, could be under Sixth Amendment protection. 
 143. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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In a second area, the relationship between privilege and constitutional 
violation under the Sixth Amendment is also relatively clear. The typical 
situation involves revelation of defense confidences, not by the defense 
attorney voluntarily revealing confidential information, but instead by a 
private individual, frequently an informant, who intrudes into client 
confidences or more generally defense confidences. Unless the 
communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege (or involves 
defense strategy), lack of governmental involvement in the intrusion 
means that no constitutional violation will be found.144 Even when the 
communication is privileged or defense strategy is involved, whether 
government involvement in causing the intrusion to occur is required for a 
constitutional violation is a significant issue, which is discussed in the next 
section. 
The principal fact pattern involves a private actor, who at the time of 
her “intrusion” has no relationship with the prosecution. If that person, 
without any deception whatsoever, is invited into the defense camp, the 
attorney-client privilege guides the dimensions of the constitutional 
protection. The communication can potentially still be covered by the 
attorney-client privilege if it lies within the concept of a “joint defense 
privilege.”145 However, if under the rules of privilege revealing the 
information to the “turncoat” renders it non-privileged because it is 
considered not to have been made in confidence, then use of the 
information—indeed even admission of the conversation at trial—would 
 
 
 144. In United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973), the court of appeals noted that 
violation of the privilege does not necessarily violate the protections of the Constitution: 
The attempted disclosure of the content of a joint conference of co-defendants with the lawyer 
of one of them may possibly give rise to a claim of privilege, see Proposed Rules of Evidence 
for the United States Court, Rule 503(b)(3), but the breach of a common law privilege, as 
such, is not necessarily of constitutional dimension. 
Id. at 1227. It is obviously correct that the dimensions of the attorney-client privilege and the 
confidentiality protection that is part of Sixth Amendment right to counsel are not identical, yet it is 
unclear why in situations where the Sixth Amendment applies, a significant revelation of privileged 
information would not violate the Sixth Amendment if the communication were used to prejudice the 
defendant. 
 145. For cases recognizing this extension of the attorney-client privilege, see, e.g., United States v. 
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 
(7th Cir. 1979). See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, § 5.15 (describing “joint 
defense or pooled information” aspect of attorney-client privilege); RICE, supra note 59, § 4.35 
(discussing generally extension of privilege for multiple clients on matters of common legal interest); 
Craig S. Lerner, Coconspirators’ Privilege and Innocents’ Refuge: A New Approach to Joint Defense 
Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1490-1514 (2002) (setting out the “core of certainty” and 
the “confounding uncertainty as to the precise details” of joint defense privilege); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (2000) (defining privilege for communications 
regarding joint defense). 
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not violate the Sixth Amendment. This third party could testify regarding 
the communication because it is not privileged. Whether that person 
becomes a witness as a matter of civic responsibility or comes to 
cooperate with the prosecution as an informant, the result should not 
differ. No evidentiary or constitutional violation occurs in this situation 
because the privilege has not been violated.146 
B. The Importance of Purposeful Governmental Action 
Except when ineffective assistance of counsel is involved, purposeful 
governmental intrusion into the confidential relationship or acquisition of 
confidential information is critical to finding a violation recognized as 
constitutionally protected. Confidential communications may be protected 
under two different constitutional rights—the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Governmental involvement is required as to both, but as 
might be expected, the required degree of involvement and culpability 
differs between these two constitutional provisions. 
C. Intrusion into Confidences Protected by the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel 
In examining Sixth Amendment claims involving informants who are 
present during confidential conversations and discussions of defense 
 
 
 146. In United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981), the court of appeals 
argued that whether or not the attorney-client privilege defines or limits the Sixth Amendment right 
generally, the privilege provided the limits in the case at hand. Thus, when conversations were held 
with an informer who had not joined the defense team, the court of appeals stated that the Sixth 
Amendment right would not exist if there were no reasonable expectation of confidentiality because of 
the informant’s presence. Id. at 645-46. The court remanded for a determination of that issue. Id. at 
646; see also Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no violation of right 
to counsel from disclosure made by agent working for defense attorney where the defense counsel had 
a duty under state law to provide the same physical evidence to the prosecution because counsel 
undertook the obligation of disclosure by virtue of removing the evidence from its original location); 
United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1975) (no Sixth Amendment violation as to 
overheard conversation by lawyer and client with a co-defendant known to be cooperating with the 
prosecution). However, as the later cases suggest, when the agent is sent into the attorney-client 
relationship or when confidential information is subsequently obtained and used even if the agent was 
not purposefully placed by the government in the defense camp, the Sixth Amendment may be 
violated. See United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 1984) (suggesting that a formal 
attorney-client relationship required for the attorney-client privilege is not a required element of a 
Sixth Amendment violation if the government uses the accused’s former attorney either intentionally 
to intrude into the defense camp or the government uses against the defendant prejudicial information 
from the former attorney, now informant, even if not intentionally obtained by the government).  
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strategy, Weatherford v. Bursey147 provides the principal Supreme Court 
guidance. There, the Court found no constitutional violation when an 
informant, who was operating as a fictive co-defendant, met with the 
defendant and his counsel on two occasions and had a conversation about 
their upcoming criminal case. The Court observed: 
[T]his is not a situation where the State’s purpose was to learn what 
it could about the defendant’s defense plans and the informant was 
instructed to intrude on the lawyer-client relationship or where the 
informant has assumed for himself that task and acted accordingly. 
Weatherford [the informant] . . . did not intrude at all; he was 
invited to the meeting, apparently not for his benefit but for the 
benefit of Bursey [the defendant] and his lawyer. . . . Weatherford 
went, not to spy, but because he was asked and because the State 
was interested in retaining his undercover services on other matters 
and it was therefore necessary to avoid raising . . . suspicion . . . .148 
It also found significant the fact that the informant communicated 
nothing about the meetings to either the police or the prosecutor.149 
The Court recognized that a critical law enforcement concern would be 
jeopardized if the informant’s presence during attorney-client 
communications constituted a per se constitutional violation. It concluded 
that such a rule could frequently lead to the unmasking of informants, who 
the Court recognized play an important role in criminal investigations: 
“[I]t would require the informant to refuse to participate in attorney-client 
meetings, even though invited, and thus for all practical purposes to 
unmask himself.”150 
While conceptually not required for a constitutional violation, if the 
protected confidential communications are admitted and prejudice the 
defendant, governmental involvement in the initial intrusion into the 
confidential communication is an extremely important factor in finding a 
violation.151 Several cases have suggested that, if the conversation was 
 
 
 147. 429 U.S. 545 (1977). 
 148. Id. at 557. 
 149. Id. at 556. 
 150. Id. at 557. 
 151. Stating with confidence what is required under Weatherford v. Bursey to constitute a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment is somewhat difficult because the Supreme Court found no 
constitutional violation. In so doing, it noted all the potential wrongs that the government did not 
commit, and in mentioning each, the implication is that the result would have been different had any of 
those facts been different. However, it may be that some combination of those factors is required 
before the Sixth Amendment is violated; but if so, the Court obviously gave no guidance. 
 In United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1981), the court of appeals listed four factors 
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received by a real co-defendant, who was acting without any governmental 
involvement, then the subsequent disclosure of the information, albeit 
confidential and privileged when initially conveyed, would not violate the 
Sixth Amendment.152 
That position is a misreading of the doctrine and is not consistent with 
the case law. Although governmental involvement in the intrusion appears 
to be of critical concern in many cases, knowing governmental 
involvement in acquiring or conveying the information is sufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation if the information is subsequently used 
to prejudice the accused, even if the initial intrusion was not with 
governmental involvement.153 More significantly for the development of 
 
 
from Weatherford v. Bursey that “must be considered” in determining whether the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel was violated based on what the Supreme Court noted did and did not happen in that 
case. Id. at 546. It listed: 
 . . . (1) whether the presence of the informant was purposely caused by the government in 
order to garner confidential, privileged information, or whether the presence of the informant 
was a result of other inadvertent occurrences; (2) whether the government obtained, directly 
or indirectly, any evidence which was used at trial as a result of the informant’s intrusion; (3) 
whether any other information gained by the informant’s intrusion was used in any other 
manner to the substantial detriment of the defendant; and finally, (4) whether the details about 
trial preparation were learned by the government. 
Id. When set out as a list, which is how they effectively appeared in Weatherford v. Bursey, see 429 
U.S. at 554, it is easy to understand the difficulty of turning them into a positive test for when a 
constitutional violation occurs.  
 152. United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rosner, 485 
F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 There is some suggestion that some courts believe that when the intrusion is by a private 
individual no constitutional violation occurs whatever the subsequent disclosure and use of the 
information may be. Brugman, 655 F.2d at 546 (because the person was a real defendant, “there was 
no constitutional restraint on his ultimately divulging whatever he had learned.”); Rosner, 485 F.2d at 
1226 (same). However, these statements, which were made prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981), which requires some prejudice for reversal of a 
conviction because of a Sixth Amendment violation, were probably meant to be limited to whether a 
purposeful violation is required for a Sixth Amendment violation if it is not shown that the information 
was conveyed to the prosecution and prejudiced the defendant. See Brugman, 655 F.2d at 546 (finding 
insufficient prejudice); Rosner, 485 F.2d at 1227-28 (requiring inquiry into whether the defendant was 
in fact prejudiced). 
 153. Knowing or willful governmental acquisition of confidential information is often distinct 
from the initial intrusion and constitutes a separate violation of constitutional principles whether or not 
it constitutes an additional violation of privilege principles. Courts have recognized that the need to 
maintain credible cover for informants may justify their participation in lawyer-client conferences 
when invited by co-participants. Acquisition of confidence in such situations is not considered a 
purposeful intrusion. However, when the prosecution knowingly or purposefully acquires the 
informant’s information regarding attorney-client conversations, it takes action that may itself support 
the violation of the right to counsel even though the initial intrusion was not improper. See United 
States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 906-07 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding informant’s actions proper but 
concluding the debriefing regarding conversations between attorney and client was unjustified by any 
valid reason and therefore supported finding a Sixth Amendment violation). 
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this Article, the cases draw no distinction between direct and derivative 
use. 
However, the main distinctions drawn in the cases are not whether the 
violation occurred in the initial intrusion or its later acquisition by the 
government or whether the remedy excludes derivative use. Rather, the 
major differences between the circuits have to do with whether and when 
prejudice may be presumed,154 and the major factual issues involve 
whether prejudice has been shown. In finding prejudice from knowing 
governmental actions, courts do not draw a distinction between direct and 
derivative use of the evidence when the defendant can show a harmful 
impact to his or her defense from the disclosure.155 Also, courts do not 
distinguish between governmental involvement in acquisition, rather than 
the initial intrusion, both being treated as sufficient. 
Three post-Weatherford cases involved what the courts consider 
purposeful intrusion.156 In United States v. Levy,157 law enforcement agents 
sought, after indictment, to learn from a government informant who was 
represented by a lawyer also representing another defendant about their 
joint trial strategy. Such information was conveyed. The court concluded: 
 
 
 154. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.8(b), at 642-43 (2d 1999) 
(discussing approaches of circuits when an intentional invasion of lawyer-client relationship occurs 
and some information is disclosed by informant to prosecution); Joshua T. Friedman, Note, The Sixth 
Amendment, Attorney-Client Relationship and Government Intrusions: Who Bears the Unbearable 
Burden of Proving Prejudice, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 109 (1991) (analyzing allocation 
of burden of showing prejudice from intrusion); see also David R. Lurie, Note, Sixth Amendment 
Implications of Informant Participation in Defense Meetings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 795 (1990). 
 155. The court in Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), made this point explicitly: 
“We recognize that the introduction of evidence obtained either directly or indirectly through 
interference with the attorney-client relationship is a paradigm example of the kind of prejudice that 
warrants finding a denial of the right to counsel.” Id. at 1472 (emphasis added); see also United States 
v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (imposing on the government a requirement of 
satisfying a Kastigar-type hearing and noting that it required a showing that information obtained was 
used neither directly nor indirectly); cf. United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(stating that prejudice could be shown, for example, by establishing that “a prosecution witness 
testified concerning privileged communications, that prosecution evidence originated in such 
communications, or that such communications have been used in any other way to the substantial 
detriment of the defendant”). 
 156. Courts frequently cite two pre-Weatherford cases from the D.C. Circuit, Coplon v. United 
States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. 1951) and Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. 1953), as 
illustrating purposeful intrusions. Coplon involved governmental interception of telephone messages 
between the accused and her lawyer before and during trial. 191 F.2d at 759. Caldwell involved 
continued use of an informant after he became a defense assistant who reported to the prosecution 
concerning “many matters connected with the impending trial” of an indicted defendant. 205 F.2d at 
880.  
 157. 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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Where there is a knowing invasion of the attorney-client 
relationship and where confidential information is disclosed to the 
government, we think that there are overwhelming considerations 
militating against a standard which tests the sixth amendment 
violation by weighing how prejudicial to the defense the disclosure 
is.158 
The court’s decision was based on the two findings that government 
enforcement officials sought confidential information from the informant 
and that defense strategy was actually disclosed.159 It thus found a per se 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, and concluding that no other remedy 
would be sufficient given that the information was now in the public 
domain, the court ordered dismissal of the indictment.160 
In Bishop v. Rose,161 a fourteen-page statement prepared by the 
defendant at the request of his lawyer regarding his activities at the time of 
the crime, for which he was formally charged, was seized from the 
defendant’s cell and used by the prosecutor in cross-examining the 
defendant at trial.162 The court concluded that the use of the document to 
attack the defendant’s credibility prejudiced his case and that this knowing 
use of the confidential letter constituted a Sixth Amendment violation, 
requiring reversal.163 In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the 
state’s argument that using the evidence to impeach the defendant’s 
testimony was permissible.164 
Going somewhat further, the court in Shillinger v. Haworth165 ruled 
that when the intrusion is intentional and groundless, prejudice is 
presumed if information is obtained by the prosecution: “[W]hen the state 
becomes privy to confidential communications because of its purposeful 
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship and lacks a legitimate 
 
 
 158. Id. at 208. 
 159. Id. at 210. 
 160. Id. 
 161. 701 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 162. Id. at 1153, 1156-57. 
 163. Id. at 1156-57. Whether a prohibition against using information, as opposed to strategy, 
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is any longer valid given subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions, is not clear. See United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2003); see also discussion infra note 181. 
 164. Bishop, 701 F.2d at 1157. 
 165. 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995). In this case, a deputy sheriff was present during conversations 
between a charged defendant and his counsel in the trial courtroom. Id. at 1134. The court of appeals 
found purposeful conduct in the prosecutor’s inquiry of the deputy “for the purpose of determining the 
substance of Haworth’s conversation with his attorney,” and that the “attorney-client communications 
were actually disclosed.” Id. at 1141. 
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justification for doing so, a prejudicial effect on the reliability of the trial 
process must be presumed.”166 The court determined that “evidence 
obtained through an intentional and improper intrusion into a defendant’s 
relationship with his attorney, as well as any ‘fruits of [the prosecution’s] 
transgression’ . . . must be suppressed.”167 Here the evidence was 
information about sessions between the defendant and his counsel 
preparing the defendant’s testimony, which was used to impeach the 
defendant’s testimony at trial.168 The court of appeals remanded for the 
trial court to determine whether a remedy beyond retrial was required 
(such as retrial by a new prosecutor or even dismissal).169 
Several other cases found the Sixth Amendment violated by knowing 
acquisition of protected information even without an improper 
governmental intrusion.170 In United States v. Singer,171 the district court 
had found that the government “knowingly intruded, though in good faith, 
into the attorney-client relationship”172 that was protected by the Sixth 
 
 
 166. Id. at 1142. 
 167. Id. at 1143 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366 (1980)) (alteration in 
original). 
 168. Id. at 1134-35, 1139. As noted with regard to Bishop v. Rose, see supra note 163, in contrast 
to use of trial strategy, it is unclear that Haworth is any longer good law in concluding that it is 
constitutionally impermissible to use a defendant’s statements obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment confidentiality protection to impeach his or her testimony at trial. 
 169. Haworth, 70 F.3d at 1143. 
 170. In United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1987), the court assumed acquisition 
constituted sufficient government action although it found no constitutional violation for other reasons. 
Id. at 1512-14. The informant, who was the defendant’s attorney in an ongoing criminal prosecution, 
had his own separate concerns about criminal responsibility and became a government informant. As 
an informant, he wore an electronic transmitting device in conversations with his client, Ofshe. The 
purpose of the conversation was to learn of new criminal conduct by Ofshe, but the conversation 
contained some “unplanned discussions” about Ofshe’s case despite the fact that the attorney had been 
warned not to “violate any attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 1511. The court of appeals found no need 
to dismiss the indictment because the only information that related to the pending case concerned 
matters of public record, and no strategic decisions were discussed. Moreover, the conversation was 
not “provided to the prosecuting attorney,” the “conversation produced no tainted evidence,” and the 
court concluded that the intrusion into any privileged matters “was not purposeful.” Id. at 1515. 
 In United States v. Sanchez, 2003 WL 21036199 (S.D. N.Y. May 6, 2003), opinion withdrawn as 
moot, id. (May 9, 2003), the district court found sufficient governmental action in acquiring the 
information by opening, reading, and using the contents of a letter from the accused, who was 
represented by counsel, which was addressed to the prosecutor but labeled “legal mail.” The court 
stated that  
[a]lthough the Government did not solicit the communication and was unaware of its content, 
it intended, when it opened the envelope, to engage in an ex parte communication. Thus, the 
Government’s interference with Sanchez’s relationship with counsel was purposeful—albeit 
not ‘manifestly and avowedly corrupt’—and therefore violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 171. 785 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 172. Id. at 232. 
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Amendment.173 The court had found the government had a legitimate 
purpose in examining protected materials provided by a co-defendant 
where the government played no role in their wrongful procurement and 
had been told they contained evidence of the commission of perjury.174 
However, the court concluded the government violated the Sixth 
Amendment when it undertook to examine the entire file, not attempting 
to limit its examination to documents substantiating the criminal 
allegation, and in the process, it reviewed confidential trial strategy 
files.175 
The district court refused to dismiss. Instead, it ordered the return of 
the irrelevant material, ordered that no government agent with knowledge 
of the file could participate in the retrial, and further ordered that no law 
enforcement officer with knowledge of the file could use or mention the 
protected contents while working on the case with the attorney retrying 
it.176 The court refused to prohibit the officer who had seen the files from 
working on the case or the officer or informant familiar with its contents 
from testifying.177 The court of appeals found the district court’s remedy to 
be effective and therefore adequate. Dismissal was not required,178 and the 
failure to exclude the testimony of the two witnesses was not erroneous 
both because the appellate court was not convinced that the confidential 
information influenced their testimony and because the defendant failed to 
show any prejudice.179 
In United States v. Danielson,180 the court distinguished obtaining 
evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment from obtaining the 
defendant’s trial strategy. In the former situation, the court accepted that 
the burden of showing prejudice could properly be placed on the 
 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 230-32. 
 175. Id. at 232. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 232. 
 178. Id. at 236-37. The court of appeals concluded under United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 365 
(1981), that dismissal was not appropriate if a lesser remedy could assure effective assistance in a later 
trial. Singer, 785 F.2d at 237. 
 179. Singer, 785 F.2d at 235-36. The court found no impact from its examination and stated that 
the defendant had failed to point to any. Id. at 236. 
 The inquiry here appeared to put the burden on the defendant and thus clearly differs from cases 
governed by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), where the government must bear that 
burden. See discussion infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
inquiry is focusing not only on evidence admitted but also on evidence derived from the improper 
intrusion into lawyer-client confidences. 
 180. 325 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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defendant.181 In the latter situation, the court found that the questions of 
prejudice were “more subtle” and concluded that the government should 
bear the burden because it would typically have superior information to 
resolve issues of prejudice.182 
In Danielson, the informant took affirmative steps to learn defense 
strategy after he had become a government agent, and government 
officials, including the attorney prosecuting the case, continued to receive 
the information after they had notice that a potential Sixth Amendment 
violation was occurring.183 In the situation where the government agent 
was not “involuntarily present at a meeting” and did not “passively 
receive[] privileged information about trial strategy,” but instead “acted 
affirmatively to intrude into the attorney-client relationship and thereby to 
obtain the privileged [trial strategy] information,”184 the burden shifted to 
the government to show no prejudice.185 
The Danielson court explicitly modeled its system after the protections 
called for when “use immunity” is granted as developed in Kastigar v. 
United States,186 which it noted prohibited both direct and indirect use.187 
 
 
 181. Id. at 1070. The court felt the defendant was in as good a position as the government to 
demonstrate prejudice from evidence that was obtained. Id. 
 As to evidence, as opposed to trial strategy, the court also accepted that the government could use 
unlawfully obtained evidence to impeach the defendant if he testified. Id. at 1067 (citing Michigan v. 
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 349-53 (1990) (allowing use of information obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment “to impeach conflicting testimony by the defendants”)). 
 182. Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1070. 
 183. Id. at 1068-69. 
 184. Id. at 1071. 
 185. Id. How the burden of showing prejudice will be allocated is considered a critical issue in 
cases where the government intruded into the attorney-client relationship. See supra note 154. The 
burden-shifting approach recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Danielson is similar to that of the 
First Circuit in United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 908 (1st Cir. 1984). 
 186. 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Kastigar applies when a grand jury target or witness asserts his or her 
Fifth Amendment privilege and is compelled to testify under a grant of use-immunity. In Counselman 
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Supreme Court struck down a statute that compelled testimony 
while granting only protection against use of the witness’ testimony in any subsequent prosecution. 
Kastigar ruled constitutional a later statute that protected against both direct and indirect use, including 
investigatory leads. However, only immunity against use of the evidence (“use immunity”) is required 
and not immunity from prosecution (“transactional immunity”). Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. 
 As noted above, formal “use immunity” protects against both direct and indirect use of the 
compelled testimony and any information derived from the evidence compelled. If evidence is 
compelled under a grant of immunity and the target is subsequently prosecuted, the government has 
the burden of demonstrating that its evidence is untainted. It bears an “affirmative duty to prove that 
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the 
compelled testimony.” Id. at 460. 
 Particularly for the testimony of witnesses, as opposed to documentary or physical evidence, the 
burden of showing lack of taint is difficult and often means that granting use immunity is inconsistent 
with prosecuting the grand jury target. In United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the 
testimony of witnesses was at issue and was affected by exposure to tainted testimony. In order to 
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When testimony is compelled after such immunity is granted, the 
government must show that “‘all of the evidence it proposes to use,’ and 
all of its trial strategy, were ‘derived from legitimate independent 
sources.’”188 
These cases demonstrate that in situations where the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel has attached, a constitutional violation occurs if the 
government purposefully intrudes into that relationship or knowingly 
acquires confidential information and uses it to the prejudice of the 
accused. When examining the facts to determine whether the information 
was used to prejudice the accused, the courts consider derivative use as 
well. 
Two different types of governmental involvement can be seen as 
sufficient to constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment. The gravest, 
but the most unlikely, is the purposeful intrusion into the confidential 
communication itself. The cases also find that, even if the government is 
not responsible for the actual intrusion, if it knowingly acquires 
communications made when the Sixth Amendment applies, that conduct 
constitutes a violation if the information acquired is used to prejudice the 
accused. 
Not only does knowing or purposeful conduct by the government in 
intruding into the confidential relationship or in acquiring the confidential 
communication justify excluding fruits, but its absence would make such 
exclusion an unfair and inappropriate remedy. Unless the government 
consciously uses improperly obtained information, it has no opportunity to 
avoid using tainted evidence and no ability to protect itself from 
irreparable taint. 
Although the remedy is based on the Sixth Amendment, the situations 
where derivative use of the violation of attorney-client privilege is 
prohibited resemble the civil cases where this same remedy is imposed. 
These are cases where formal adversarial proceedings have begun and 
where the intrusion poses a substantial threat to the fairness of the 
litigation process. 
 
 
show lack of taint, the court of appeals required that the testimony have been fixed or “canned” in 
advance of the illegality. Id. at 872. If courts follow the analysis of United States v. North, 920 F.2d 
940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (opinion on rehearing), the requirements are particularly onerous. In that case, the 
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that both prosecutors and witnesses must be shielded from exposure 
to immunized testimony and emphasized that proof must be shown to be independent of evidence 
indirectly derived from immunized testimony. Id. at 947. 
 187. Danielson, 325 F.3d at 1072. 
 188. Id. (quoting Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460). 
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D. Intrusion into Confidential Communications Between Client and 
Attorney Where the Sixth Amendment Provides No Protection for 
Attorney-Client Confidentiality 
Under Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
does not attach until the defendant formally becomes the accused by way 
of formal accusation.189 Thus, an intrusion into attorney-client 
communications before formal accusation cannot not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.190 If fruits are to be suppressed under a constitutional 
remedy, another provision must be enlisted. The most likely candidates are 
the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment due process right and the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Courts have recognized 
only the Due Process Clause as potentially providing such protection. 
1. Due Process Protection Against Egregious Governmental Conduct 
A group of cases decided by the United States Courts of Appeals have 
recognized as a theoretical matter that governmental intrusion into 
privileged communications between client and attorney could violate the 
Due Process Clause. However, in each of the cases, the court ultimately 
found that on the facts presented no constitutional violation had occurred. 
In United States v. White,191 the Seventh Circuit assumed that, in the 
absence of a constitutionally protected interest under the Sixth 
Amendment, a due process violation may require the exclusion of the 
 
 
 189. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment right 
attached upon arraignment on a warrant); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (holding that 
Sixth Amendment rights attach at “formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment”). 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not cover materials seized before formal 
adversarial proceedings began and that use of those materials after indictment did not qualify as Sixth 
Amendment violation); Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that client’s 
confession of murder to his attorney, who had represented him on other (civil) matters, was not 
protected by Sixth Amendment because at the time of the confession adversarial proceedings had not 
yet begun); United States v. White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding Sixth Amendment 
claim without merit where, although confidential documents were obtained from an attorney, the 
lawyer was neither representing the defendant in a criminal case nor had the case moved from the 
investigative to the accusatorial stage); United States ex rel. Shiflet v. Lane, 815 F.2d 457, 464-65 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (ruling that confidential communication from client to investigator working for his retained 
lawyer regarding murder that was provided by investigator to police was not covered by Sixth 
Amendment because the client had not yet been formally charged). 
 191. 879 F.2d 1509 (7th Cir. 1989). Several related cases involved brothers, Daniel and Richard 
White, with the involved brother’s name shown in parentheses. This case involved Richard White. 
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indirect consequences of a violation of the attorney-client privilege.192 In 
remanding, the circuit court focused on two issues: “first, whether the 
government procured or was otherwise complicit in a violation of the 
attorney-client privilege and, second, if so, whether the violation resulted 
in the introduction of evidence sufficiently material and adverse to 
[defendant] White that the failure to exclude it denied him his basic 
procedural rights.”193 
After remand, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that reversal was not required for three reasons: first, that there 
was no privilege because the documents were not confidential since the 
defendant intended to disclose them;194 second, that the government did 
not induce the attorney to violate the attorney-client privilege (if it had 
existed);195 and third, that none of the information was used at trial.196 The 
required governmental involvement is most notable. Even though the 
attorney copied documents and delivered those documents to the 
prosecutor, and the prosecution apparently used those documents in front 
of the grand jury,197 such use did not violate constitutional limits because 
the government had not induced the lawyer to violate the privilege.198 
In United States v. Voigt,199 the court of appeals stated the requirements 
for finding actionable (outrageous) government action violating the Due 
Process Clause: “(1) the government’s objective awareness of an ongoing, 
personal attorney-client relationship between its informant and the 
defendant; (2) deliberate intrusion into that relationship; and (3) actual and 
substantial prejudice.”200 In Voigt, the government’s informant was alleged 
by the defendant to be his attorney, but the Sixth Amendment right to 
 
 
 192. Id. at 1513. 
 193. Id. at 1514. 
 194. United States v. (Richard) White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding intent to 
disclose information as part of bankruptcy filing). 
 195. Id. at 431. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 429. 
 198. Id. at 431. The prosecutor had understood that the attorney was going to review the 
potentially confidential files, but the prosecutor had not expected the attorney to copy them or to 
provide a copy to the government. However, the prosecutor accepted those records when provided. Id. 
at 429, 431; see also United States v. (Daniel) White, 970 F.2d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating in a 
related case that “the government did not induce that violation” and concluding that the attorney’s 
hope for leniency in his own prosecution by providing information was insufficient to show a 
constitutional violation without an explicit or implicit agreement). 
 199. 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 200. Id. at 1067 (footnote omitted). 
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counsel did not apply. On the issue of purposefulness, the court found that 
there was no evidence that the disclosure, if it occurred, was at the behest 
of government agents and found the record fell “woefully short of 
establishing the sort of purposeful intrusion” required.201 
As in Voigt, the deliberateness of the government’s conduct was the 
central concern of the court in United States ex rel. Shiflet v. Lane.202 In 
that case, a defense investigator obtained the defendant’s incriminating 
revelations about how he committed a murder and conveyed it to law 
enforcement authorities. The court found that use of information provided 
by an investigator to establish probable cause for a search warrant that 
yielded incriminating evidence did not violate the Due Process Clause. 
The court found the conduct was not particularly egregious. The only use 
of the evidence was to obtain a search warrant, and the authorities openly 
acknowledged the use of the information.203 
When examined under the Due Process Clause, the primary concern is 
the degree and culpability of the government’s conduct in intruding into 
the protected attorney-client relationship. Only where the conduct is 
outrageous204 and the suspect is prejudiced, whether that is by direct or 
derivative use, will a remedy be granted. The showing required to 
establish a constitutional violation is indeed demanding.205 However, as 
with the cases decided under the Sixth Amendment, when alleged 
governmental misconduct is examined under the Due Process Clause, no 
distinction is drawn between direct and derivative use of the evidence.  
 
 
 201. Id. at 1069. 
 202. 815 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 203. Id. at 465-66. Although the federal court did not rely upon the point that the investigator 
contacted the police with the information on his own rather than being encouraged to invade the 
confidential relationship, the state court relied on this fact in its ruling, id. at 462, and it may well have 
played a part in the federal court of appeals ruling with regard to due process. 
 204. United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000), demonstrates that purposeful 
intrusion into a relationship protected by an evidentiary privilege and use of the information obtained 
are not always sufficient to warrant reversal. In that case, the government under an authorized wiretap 
intercepted protected conversations between a target of the investigation and her psychiatrist, and it 
used the information learned to fashion an effective ploy to have the target produce incriminating 
information. Id. at 550-51, 558-60. While ambiguous in its meaning, the court may have been 
suggesting that it believed the due process remedy was available only for violations of the attorney-
client privilege. See id. at 560 n.8. It certainly did not find the government’s conduct outrageous. Id. 
For further discussion of Squillacote, see infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text. 
 205. Although a number of cases have recognized the possibility that the conviction would be 
reversed on the basis of a due process violation, no clear example could be found where that relief was 
actually granted. 
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2. Lack of Meaningful Protection as a Part of the Privilege Against 
Compulsory Self-Incrimination 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
by itself provides only indirect support to protecting communications 
covered by evidentiary privileges. The Fifth Amendment is personal, and 
the lawyer asserts the client’s self-incrimination privilege to avoid 
testifying.206 The lawyer can assert the attorney-client privilege where the 
incriminating communication was made confidentially for the purpose of 
obtaining legal advice. Indeed, the Supreme Court stated in Fisher v. 
United States207 that it is important that the attorney-client privilege be 
available to cover incriminating communications for “if the client knows 
that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the 
attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of 
disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it 
would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.”208 Nevertheless, 
if information were obtained from the attorney without the client being 
compelled to provide it, the client’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination would not be violated. 
Thus, if the government obtains the incriminating information from the 
attorney, it may undercut the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, but it does not violate that constitutional prohibition. The 
government’s actions in securing incriminating client information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege may be so contrary to fair play 
that they violate the Due Process Clause, but due process is the 
constitutional principle that must be invoked rather than the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination. 
In summary, while a private violation of the privilege will exclude the 
privileged communication as a direct consequence of the evidentiary 
privilege itself in a criminal case, evidentiary privileges standing alone 
will not justify protection against derivative use. Where the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel applies, protection is available against 
derivative use when the government purposefully or knowingly intrudes 
into the communication or acquires the confidential information and uses 
 
 
 206. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) (stating that “the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is a purely personal one”); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (ruling that 
documentary subpoena directed to taxpayer’s accountant did not violate taxpayer’s Fifth Amendment 
right because there was no compulsion on the taxpayer, the only person who could properly assert the 
privilege). 
 207. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
 208. Id. at 403. 
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it to the defendant’s detriment. In the absence of Sixth Amendment 
protection, only where fundamental fairness of the trial is threatened by 
the intrusion will such a remedy be granted, and the showing of purposeful 
misconduct will have to be great to establish a due process violation. 
E. Concern About Remedy 
Courts find that some types of harms do not constitute prohibited 
indirect uses. If confidential material is used only at the investigatory stage 
and provides only reassurance to the government as to the strength of its 
case, courts conclude that such limited use is not constitutionally 
forbidden.209 Thus, dismissal of an indictment is not required, and 
suppression of any improperly obtained evidence, whether direct or 
derivative, is a sufficient remedy.210 
However, the major issues regarding remedies are not about harms too 
insignificant to justify any remedy, but rather concern about the far-
reaching implications of a remedy that excludes derivative evidence. Judge 
Posner stated part of the concern explicitly: “Exclusionary remedies are 
strong medicine, normally reserved for constitutional violations and 
challenged even there . . . .”211 In many of the criminal cases noted earlier, 
the defendant was seeking an extreme remedy as a consequence of 
exclusion of derivative evidence: the dismissal of the charges because of 
alleged irreparable taint. The extraordinary nature of that claim, although 
only occasionally discussed, plays a major role, I suspect, in the 
analysis.212 Dismissal is a result that courts move to with great caution. 
 
 
 209. United States v. (Daniel) White, 970 F.2d 328, 336 (7th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. 
Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 1991) (ruling that “confirmatory use” of documents at the 
investigative stage did not constitute prohibited derivative use). 
 210. United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1985). In Rogers, the defendant 
argued that the disclosures of privileged information solicited by government agents from his former 
attorney encouraged the IRS to continue its investigation of the defendant and ultimately to indict him. 
Id. at 1077-79. As a result, he argued that the appropriate remedy was dismissal. As noted in the text, 
the court rejected his argument, drawing a distinction between the use of privileged information during 
the investigative period and at trial. Id. at 1079 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 
(1974) (ruling that information obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be presented to a 
grand jury)); see also Chase v. State, 706 A.2d 613, 616-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (refusing to 
apply fruits rationale to confidential marital privilege used to provide probable cause for arrest and 
search). 
 211. United States v. (Richard) White, 879 F.2d 1509, 1513 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 212. In People v. Burnidge, 687 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. 1997), the court noted that, in arguing for 
dismissal of the case, defendant was seeking a remedy “more extensive in scope than the evil of which 
he complain[ed].” Id. at 818. The court believed an adequate remedy was the suppression of testimony 
and a report based on the defendant’s statements to a minister about child sexual abuse. Id. These 
statements were covered by the clergyman privilege and were improperly disclosed to authorities. Id. 
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Since the outcome stops the prosecution, there are strong reasons to 
require both that the government have been in some measure in control of 
the violation and that it have been knowledgeable about the use of 
privileged information.213 
In United States v. Squillacote,214 the court of appeals discussed and 
applied these concerns about the extent of remedies and derivative 
evidence. Using an authorized wiretap, the government intercepted and 
transcribed two confidential communications between the defendant and 
her psychotherapist. The court acknowledged that the conversations were 
covered by the psychotherapist privilege215 and that information was used 
to help develop an effective ruse that revealed the defendant’s prior 
espionage activity.216 The defendant contended that any evidence derived 
from the confidential information must be suppressed and that a hearing to 
determine whether any such evidence had been used at trial had to be 
conducted under the principles of Kastigar v. United States,217 which as 
noted earlier is designed to guard against indirect use of information 
compelled under “use immunity.”218 
Although the court accepted that the defendant’s conversations were in 
fact privileged and that the government intentionally and effectively used 
the information, the court nevertheless denied any remedy. It found that 
the Kastigar analysis is properly triggered only if the government through 
judicial action compels a witness to testify under a grant of immunity.219 
After stating that evidentiary privileges must be strictly construed because 
they “contravene the fundamental principle that the public . . . has a right 
 
 
at 815-16. The court formally rested its decision on a concept of inevitable discovery, id. at 817 (citing 
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)), which on the facts is debatable. Id. at 817-18. Throughout, the 
court’s overriding concern about the extent of the remedy requested is clear. 
 213. The court in United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973), suggested that a per se 
rule of reversal should apply to purposeful intrusion where the government’s action is “ruthless 
beyond justification,” and where such misconduct is a “corrupting practice which may justify freeing 
one guilty person to vindicate the rule of law for all others.” Id. at 1227. While prejudice is clearly 
now required even for purposeful conduct, see United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 365 (1981), the 
sentiment expressed by Rosner regarding the degree of government misconduct remains accurate as to 
when dismissal may be considered an appropriate remedy, which was the remedy the defendant in 
Rosner was effectively requesting. Rosner, 485 F.2d at 1228. 
 214. 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 215. Id. at 559 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15  (1996)). 
 216. Id. at 550-51, 558. 
 217. 406 U.S. 441 (1972) 
 218. For discussion of Kastigar and use-immunity, see supra note 186. 
 219. Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 559. The court stated that Kastigar protections could be based on a 
non-constitutional privilege but required as to those privileges that the testimony be compelled by a 
government promise that the privileged testimony would not be used in any way. Id. at 559-60. 
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to every man’s evidence,”220 and noting that other circuits had agreed that 
violation of evidentiary privileges did not require suppression of derivative 
evidence,221 the court upheld the denial of a Kastigar hearing and the 
refusal to suppress any evidence derived from the government’s 
interception of the defendant’s conversations with her psychiatrist.222 The 
court noted the possibility of suppression of derivative evidence “under 
extraordinary circumstances . . . in cases involving the attorney-client 
privilege,” but found that possibility inapplicable to the case at hand.223 
The court in Squillacote was unusual in explicitly discussing and 
rejecting a Kastigar-type remedy. Its concern with onerous procedures and 
extraordinary remedies was likely not far below the surface for other 
courts as they examined whether fruits of evidentiary violations should be 
excluded. In most cases, the implications for irrevocably tainting 
prosecutions before the responsible government officials even have 
knowledge of a private individual’s violation of privileges is one concern. 
 
 
 220. Id. at 560 (quoting Trammell v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)). 
 221. Id. at 560. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 560 n.8 (citing United States v. (Daniel) White, 970 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 There may indeed be a special/“privileged” place for the attorney-client privilege with respect to 
protection against derivative use when it comes to suppressing derivative use of evidence in criminal 
cases. United States v. Ankeny, 30 M.J. 10 (C.M.A. 1990), provides a unique fact pattern where a court 
suppressed derivative evidence and required dismissal of a charge relying upon the attorney-client 
privilege, without a constitutional backing. In Ankeny, the defendant’s civilian counsel, without 
knowing the significance of his statement under military law, conveyed information about an unknown 
military offense to a military lawyer in the process of attempting to resolve a pending charge. Id. at 11-
12. The Military Court of Appeals declined to rest its decision on ineffective assistance of counsel 
because it was either unavailable or questionable in that formal charges had not been filed and the 
government had not made an affirmative intrusion into the protected relationship. Id. at 12. In 
construing the attorney-client privilege to cover derivative evidence, the court relied on its prior 
precedent that prevented “the use ‘in any way’ of an improperly divulged communication.” Id. at 15-
16 (citations omitted). 
 The result in Ankeny is exceptional, perhaps explained—as the court asserted—as simply a matter 
of peculiar precedent. That explanation is possible, but this case may really be about the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause providing protection to the attorney-client privilege in very 
limited situations. I think it is something like that, recognizing the central importance of an attorney 
acting on behalf of a criminal suspect as to the client’s confidential communications outside the 
narrow confines of the Sixth Amendment.  
 It is also interesting to note that the court acknowledged the importance of party responsibility and 
the danger of collusive action. As to the latter, this was not a situation where the facts suggested “a 
Machiavellian effort by . . . counsel to engineer a breach of the attorney-client relationship for the 
purpose of preventing his client’s prosecution.” Id. at 17. The majority acknowledged the dissenting 
judge’s position in the court below that “‘loose lips’ of the defense should not be permitted to sink the 
Government’s ship” id. (quoting United States v. Ankeny, 28 M.J. 780, 788 (N-M.C.M.R. 1989), but 
found a suitable counterweight in the unfairness of deciding the defendant’s fate based on the actions 
of inept defense counsel—describing the situation metaphorically as one in which “a military 
accused’s ‘ship’ is accidentally scuttled by its captain.” Id.  
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The impact a fruits rationale would have on the use of informants 
generally, who often act for their own motives and beyond the control of 
their “handlers,” might be substantial. Of particular concern would be the 
ability of apparent informants, acting as double agents eager to create such 
irrevocable taint, to infect the prosecution and thereby thwart justice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the case law in this Article has shown that evidentiary 
privileges as construed by the courts do not provide for the suppression of 
the fruits of erroneously disclosed confidences covered by such privileges. 
Protection for out-of-court disclosures was often not part of the common-
law tradition of privileges that in a number of situations provided no 
protection when confidential information was conveyed to third parties 
outside judicial proceedings. 
When derivative protection is granted to privileged communications, it 
must be justified by other doctrines that may overlap with the 
confidentiality policy interests protected by evidentiary privileges. Such 
suppression typically occurs when a privilege is violated by a party 
immediately involved in litigation and when the privilege at issue is the 
attorney-client privilege. When the courtroom is figuratively in sight, 
excluding fruits of a violation of protected confidences may be appropriate 
if exclusion is important to protect fairness in the litigation process. 
The exclusion of fruits may be ordered in civil cases when parties 
secure confidential information through unauthorized practices that the 
trial court considers unfair and may even challenge its judicial authority. 
In criminal cases, exclusion of fruits may be authorized under the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, either through ineffective assistance or 
because the government intercepted or acquired and used confidential 
client communications. When a formal prosecution has not yet 
commenced, suppression potentially may be justified under the Due 
Process Clause if, through outrageous government intrusion, the fairness 
of the adversarial process is clearly undermined. Although privileges other 
than the attorney-client privilege conceptually could be protected in 
similar situations,224 their violation is less likely to undercut adversarial 
fairness in litigation, the fundamental concern at work when fruits are 
excluded. 
 
 
 224. For example, see the discussion of People v. Kaiser, 606 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), 
which involved suppression of fruits of the violation through improper use of subpoenas of the doctor-
patient privilege, supra note 91. 
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In all of these cases, the party against whom the fruits sanction is 
imposed must have engaged in at least knowing action. Party culpability is 
a necessary condition of excluding evidence derived from a protected 
confidential communication. 
The reticence to impose a remedy that excludes derivative evidence in 
criminal cases springs from a number of concerns. One is that evidentiary 
privileges can easily be violated by private parties who have no formal 
connection to the government. Courts are reluctant to visit upon the public 
a powerful remedy that may loose a dangerous criminal when the person 
responsible for the breach is another private citizen. 
Also, if violations of evidentiary privileges by private parties were 
routinely to necessitate a hearing to determine whether evidence had been 
tainted, prosecutions could be imperiled without any triggering 
governmental action, and thus without the notice that precautions should 
be taken to shield witnesses from taint and to place uncontaminated 
evidence on the record. The inability of the government to protect itself 
from irreparably tainted prosecutions is by itself almost enough to ensure 
that fruits protection cannot routinely result from private parties violating 
evidentiary privileges. 
Of perhaps greatest concern to the government are violations of 
privileges where the government is not in full control of the person, 
typically an informant, who caused the breach. In such situations, the 
government might not have immediate knowledge that a breach occurred 
or accurate details about how it occurred. Evidence derived from the 
intrusion could easily seep so deeply into the prosecution’s case that the 
taint could never be fully removed. Presently, even when confined to 
formal grants of immunity, prosecutors complain about the great difficulty 
of making the showing required in a Kastigar-type hearing. However, with 
regard to formal use immunity, prosecutors are able to control when such a 
showing must be made because the burden is only triggered by the formal 
step of granting use immunity,225 but they would lack such a clear 
“trigger” when violations of evidentiary privileges were involved.  
Nevertheless, to avoid making violations too tempting, some limitation 
must be imposed on the government’s derivative use of its own violation 
 
 
 225. The unreliability and unpredictability of informants exacerbate the uncertainties and dangers 
for the government. Informants may go further than instructed in an effort to gain leverage for their 
future bargaining. They may lie about what they have done and the timing of their actions. They may 
even be acting as double agents, who by collusive action intended to aid the defendant, purposefully 
spreading tainted evidence throughout the government’s case to thwart successful prosecution of an 
ally. Given these possibilities, an easily triggered Kastigar-type proceeding could pose a great threat to 
successful prosecutions. 
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of confidences for privileges in addition to the attorney-client privilege. 
The result in Squillacote, where the government listened to the 
confidential communications with a target’s psychiatrist and used the 
insights learned from that interception to generate a successful sting 
operation,226 is unacceptable. When instead of a professional such as a 
doctor or lawyer, who would likely be sensitive to civil penalties and 
disciplinary sanctions, it is a government official who commits the 
violation, as in Squillacote, an effective sanction must be available to 
prevent potentially expansive abuses, and suppression of all benefits 
gained from the government’s violation is likely the only effective 
remedy. However, situations where such a remedy is necessary appear 
very rare. 
Even where the government is the violator, one sees another reason for 
judicial reticence to impose a prohibition against derivative use. The 
remedy would likely be dismissal of the prosecution. Often the breach of 
the evidentiary privilege provides a critical element of the prosecution’s 
case—sometimes its only knowledge of the crime. Whenever dismissal is 
the required remedy, courts are likely to act only reluctantly, and that 
pattern is borne out in the case law. 
The general inference to be drawn from the case law is that the policy 
of protecting privileged conversations is not itself of sufficient strength to 
justify the far-reaching remedy of excluding fruits. It should come as no 
surprise that violations of evidentiary privileges do not produce strong 
remedies. As a general matter, evidentiary privileges are weak instruments 
to protect confidential communications. 
Privileges sometimes perform a critical role in keeping the 
communication confidential at the most significant moment—in court so 
that the jury does not hear the communication—and when judicial 
compulsion would otherwise force the testimony. However, if the 
confidences are to remain secret, the major part of the effort to maintain 
the confidence must be done by the parties to the communication by 
protecting it from disclosure outside the courtroom.227 Evidentiary 
privileges cannot be expected to restore confidentiality when it has been 
effectively lost through out-of-court disclosures. Outside the courtroom, 
 
 
 226. See discussion supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text. 
 227. Cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of 
Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REV. 315, 322-23 (2003) (observing that the focus of persons 
revealing confidences is on the immediate concern of whether the person receiving the information 
will protect it rather than on the potential of it being disclosed or protected in some later judicial 
proceeding). 
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privileges cannot even limit the damage. But, in the controlled setting of 
the courtroom, where the facts available to the jury are tightly and 
artificially limited, privileges can be effective. Thus, as trial approaches 
and a party takes actions that appear designed to thwart the limited, but 
critical, role of privileges, then broader remedies may be appropriate. In 
those situations, courts often exclude not only the confidential 
communication but also the evidence derived from it. 
Obviously, this picture of limited protection for out-of-court 
communications could change or, more appropriately, could be changed. 
The concepts and case law discussed in this Article could provide a 
platform for changing the outcomes as privilege laws are further 
“codified”228 and as established rules of privilege in many states are 
modified. Should those rules be written (or re-written) so that fruits of 
evidentiary privilege violations are uniformly excluded? While on first 
examination some of the results in the cases may “feel” a bit wrong, I do 
not believe there is a good case for protecting fruits of the violation of 
evidentiary privileges as a general matter. 
That expansive remedy is appropriately saved for special cases. In the 
criminal context, those special cases, such as the government’s 
interception of confidential communications with a psychiatrist as 
happened in Squillacote or its acquiring of incriminating revelations made 
by a suspect to his or her attorney, are appropriately handled under the 
Due Process Clause. Courts should grant relief in those rare cases where 
governmental intrusion is purposeful, directly undermines important 
values, and threatens fairness. Recognizing and sanctioning the rare case 
should not and will not “open the floodgates” to a general protection of 
derivative evidence, and courts should not shy away from imposing a 
remedy that signals to law enforcement officials and prosecutors that 
limits do exist and that intentional violations have serious consequences. 
For civil cases, the courts’ power to police violations of discovery rules 
and ethical principles should provide adequate authority to handle most 
meritorious cases. Admittedly, the results under this largely ad hoc system 
 
 
 228. See Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (2002) (arguing for need to create a set of 
federal rules of privilege); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 65 (2002) 
(advocating both creation of federal rules of privilege and federalizing the law of privilege). Some 
initial efforts were made to begin developing such rules, see supra notes 122-26 and accompanying 
text, but the effort is now directed to developing a survey that reflects the existing state of federal 
privilege law. Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of October 18, 2002, 
at 14-15; Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 25, 2003, at 18-19. 
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will not be perfect, but they are preferable to a system where routine 
violations of privileges result in suppression of fruits. 
Thus, my proposal for rules drafting is that no additional protection be 
provided either generally or, as discussed earlier,229 in the area of 
inadvertent disclosures. Clarification of the state of the law would be 
helpful, however. It would be helpful if, in the text of some general rule on 
administration of privilege rules or in official commentary, rule drafters 
make explicit that evidentiary privileges do not on their own require 
exclusion of derivative use of improper disclosures. Such protection is not 
prohibited and is possible but must be obtained through other legal tools 
and principles. 
I move now to a slightly different area. A number of the cases that are 
discussed in this Article arose in the context of child abuse and were 
influenced by mandatory reporting laws for such abuse. This Article is not 
about those laws nor is the subject of derivative use inherently linked to 
reporting laws. However, the subjects intersect because of the close 
connection between the protection of confidences and evidentiary 
privileges. Moreover, reporting laws do raise the largely unresolved 
question of when, if ever, privileges cover and protect out-of-court 
disclosure of confidences. 
I believe that clarification of the law is needed and that some change in 
the generally accepted law is warranted with respect to mandatory 
reporting laws for child abuse and related reporting laws as well. Some 
years ago, I wrote that whether reporting laws were intended to honor or to 
abrogate various evidentiary privileges needed clarification.230 Because the 
responsibility to report occurs entirely outside a courtroom context, a 
person who receives a confidential communication containing information 
otherwise subject to reporting laws is often uncertain, absent explicit 
guidance, whether failing to report the suspected abuse violates mandatory 
legal duties that may result in criminal penalties,231 or whether reporting it 
instead violates professional obligations of confidentiality that may entail 
professional discipline and civil liability. I strongly suggest explicit 
resolution of both the basic issue of whether privileges apply to reporting 
obligations and the specific question of whether child abuse reporting 
 
 
 229. See supra Part IV. 
 230. Mosteller, supra note 53, at 273-74. 
 231. Id. at 241-43 (discussing the procedural difficulty of determining whether an attorney has an 
obligation to report suspected abuse within the period of time set in reporting statutes, when a legal 
obligation will be violated, if that information is protected by the attorney-client privilege). 
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requirements are intended to override some evidentiary privileges, or all of 
them. 
I propose that privilege rules include a provision that extends the scope 
of the protection to legal obligations to report. Privileges are designed 
generally to provide legal justification to refuse to provide testimony—to 
resist disclosure under compulsion in a judicial setting.232 As noted 
earlier,233 rarely in American law are legal obligations imposed to provide 
confidential information other than through some type of testimony. In 
situations where an obligation to disclose confidential information has 
been imposed through the coercive force of reporting laws, privilege rules 
should be extended to cover this type of legal compulsion just as they 
cover compulsion through courtroom testimony. The issue of coverage 
should be resolved. Reporting requirements, like testimony, should be 
covered, and coverage should mean protection of the confidential 
communication.234 
At the same time that I advocate a default rule of coverage and 
protection, I recognize that reporting requirements may be determined by 
legislatures to rest on stronger policy grounds than some or all evidentiary 
 
 
 232. Professor Imwinkelried succinctly and accurate describes the reasons why ordinarily out-of-
court disclosures do not violate evidentiary privileges as follows: “[T]he privilege applies only to 
compelled disclosure in a legal proceeding. Because the attorney does not make the statement in a 
court subject to compulsory process, the privilege itself is inapplicable.” 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 
51, § 6.6.6, at 618. 
 The explanation has two components. The first is a requirement of legal compulsion. The second 
is that the statement occurs in court. While reporting laws do not require in-court testimony, which 
means that they are not currently covered by privilege laws that follow formal definitions, they do 
involve what I believe is the more important component of the normal two-part requirement—legal 
compulsion. Here, indeed, the holder of the privilege is not the subject of the legal compulsion and as a 
result cannot willingly accept a real, but relatively minor, penalty with the prospects that later litigation 
will vindicate the assertion. Unlike the situation in Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975), where the 
Supreme Court held: (1) that an attorney could not be punished for contempt for producing his or her 
client’s refusal to comply with an order as a method of litigating a claim; and (2) that a lawyer is 
presumptively guilty of a completed crime when the time period for reporting expires. There is no 
settled case law that good faith questions about the application of the privilege or professional 
responsibility rules regarding client confidences constitute a defense to a failure to make the required 
report. 
 I contend that legislatures should resolve the uncertainty of application and determine 
substantively when reporting laws should override privilege laws. My argument is not that privilege 
laws or reporting laws should always prevail but rather that the uncertainty should be removed. I 
believe the general policies supporting privilege laws should protect against the penalties of reporting 
requirements, except when the legislature determines that the policies behind privileges are 
predominant. Legislative judgment should resolve the conflict rather than uncertainty and fear of 
criminal sanctions. 
 233. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 234. I have argued previously that, while the state of the law is far from clear, good arguments can 
be made for applying the attorney-client privilege to reporting laws. Mosteller, supra note 53, at 224-
37. 
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privileges. However, the decision of which, if any, privileges should 
continue to shield disclosure should be made with reference to particular 
reporting obligations involved, such as the requirement to report suspected 
child abuse. Thus, it is most sensible for the reporting law to specify which 
if any privileges are over-ridden by that particular reporting law. In doing 
so, the legislature can make judgments as to whether particular evidentiary 
privileges—attorney-client privilege, psychotherapist-patient privilege, the 
clergy privilege, and husband-wife confidential communications 
privilege—should give way or be maintained as to that particular reporting 
requirement. In this process, the legislature resolves explicitly and 
particularly which sets of policies and laws are preeminent. The weighing 
of interests can be accomplished more precisely in the context of the 
reporting law than as a provision of a particular privilege.235 
For the strongest proponents of evidentiary privileges, particularly for 
advocates of the attorney-client privilege, not requiring the exclusion of 
the fruits of improper out-of-court disclosures of protected confidential 
information must be disappointing. However, this limitation is both well 
established in the case law and, in my judgment, generally justified. While 
neither elegant nor simple, protection for fruits is theoretically available 
for many of the situations where need and justification are greatest. 
Finally, under the existing legal structure, the exclusion of derivative 
evidence does not pose a frequent threat to immunize guilty criminals. 
 
 
 235. I am here taking issue with the approach adopted by the Uniform Rules of Evidence in Rule 
503, the Psychotherapist/Physician/Mental Health Provider-Patient Privilege. UNIF. RULES OF 
EVIDENCE R. 503 (amended 1999), 13A U.L.A. 69-71 (Supp. 2003-2004). In paragraph (d)(8), the rule 
proposes an exception for a communication “that is subject to a duty to disclose under [statutory law].” 
R. 503(d)(8). This result is better handled by a provision in the reporting law declaring that the 
privilege is overcome as to the reporting duty. 
 As Rule 503 stands, it raises a number of questions that are nowhere answered. First, it suggests 
that absent the exception, this privilege and presumably all other evidentiary privileges would apply to 
reporting obligations, which is not clear as to this or other privileges. Second, the exception is not 
contained directly in the attorney-client privilege, R. 502, or the clergy privilege, R. 505. Moreover, 
although indirectly covered for spousal privileges, R. 504, for some victims, is not included as a 
general exception for reporting laws in this area where the need is generally perceived as the greatest. 
See R. 504(c)(3). Third, while presumably the exception was drafted to cover reporting laws for child 
abuse and neglect and the abuse of others who are disadvantaged, such as mental patients, the 
handicapped, and the elderly, who are all mentioned in the commentary, the exception is not so 
limited. Reporting laws are generally excepted without regard to the balancing of interests between 
those of the particular reporting law and the value of the privilege. At least with respect to where to 
locate the exception, I am supportive of the approach taken by Oregon, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and 
Rhode Island in locating the exceptions for certain privileges, which are quite detailed and varied, 
within the child abuse reporting laws. See supra note 55. Connecticut, which follows the approach of 
the Uniform Rules, makes the exception part of privilege law as to the psychotherapist privilege. 
However, it accomplishes largely the same result I suggest by exclusively limiting the exception to the 
privilege to child abuse reporting. See id. 
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